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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Eurofound’s new multiannual work programme was launched in 2017, initiating a series of 
research and communication activities in the areas that the Agency has identified as critical to progress 
in the upward convergence of living and working conditions across Europe. These six strategic areas for 
intervention are: 
1. Working conditions and sustainable work 
2. Industrial relations 
3. Labour market change 
4. Quality of life and public services 
5. The digital age: Challenges for work and employment 
6. Monitoring convergence in the European Union 
Labour markets are healthier than they have been in a decade, with more people in work than ever before 
and the number of people active in the labour market at an all-time high. Unemployment is decreasing 
across the Member States, and youth unemployment fell dramatically over the course of 2017. While 
these are undeniable achievements, other dimensions of the employment narrative, highlighted by 
Eurofound’s labour market research, also demand our attention: the fact that there are not enough jobs to 
meet the demand for work, that too many workers struggle with poverty, and that a large group of people 
are completely alienated from the labour market, all of which is socially destructive. 
The social impact of economic change and political decisions was set out in the first major output of 
Eurofound’s programme – the results of the 2016 European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). This rich data 
source describes a Europe that has rallied from the wreckage of the recession. Across many dimensions 
of quality of life, Europeans are doing at least as well as before the economic crisis, if not better. But as 
well as heralding good news, the EQLS sends a clear signal that groups within our society are being failed 
by the economy, the labour market and social policy, that significant social inequalities remain, and that 
many citizens are anxious about the future. 
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Eurofound’s new multiannual work programme was
launched in 2017, initiating a series of research and
communication activities in the areas that the Agency
has identified as critical to progress in the upward
convergence of living and working conditions across
Europe. These six strategic areas for intervention are:  
1. Working conditions and sustainable work 
2. Industrial relations 
3. Labour market change 
4. Quality of life and public services 
5. The digital age: Challenges for work and
employment 
6. Monitoring convergence in the European Union 
Labour markets are healthier than they have been in a
decade, with more people in work than ever before and
the number of people active in the labour market at an
all-time high. Unemployment is decreasing across the
Member States, and youth unemployment fell
dramatically over the course of 2017. While these are
undeniable achievements, other dimensions of the
employment narrative, highlighted by Eurofound’s
labour market research, also demand our attention:
the fact that there are not enough jobs to meet the
demand for work, that too many workers struggle with
poverty, and that a large group of people are completely
alienated from the labour market, all of which is socially
destructive.  
The social impact of economic change and political
decisions was set out in the first major output of
Eurofound’s programme – the results of the 2016
European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). This rich data
source describes a Europe that has rallied from the
wreckage of the recession. Across many dimensions of
quality of life, Europeans are doing at least as well as
before the economic crisis, if not better. But as well as
heralding good news, the EQLS sends a clear signal that
groups within our society are being failed by the
economy, the labour market and social policy, that
significant social inequalities remain, and that many
citizens are anxious about the future.  
Sixty years after the signing of the founding treaty, the
Rome Declaration in March 2017 marked this
anniversary with an assertion from European leaders of
their determination to carry the European project
forward. To do so, the EU must address the tensions
between progress and stagnation; it must put social
Europe first. And the European Pillar of Social Rights,
launched at the Gothenburg Social Summit in
November, is a recognition of that. Its goal is to redress
the imbalance between the social and economic
priorities of the EU to achieve the promised ‘social triple
A’ across the Union. The EQLS, along with a range of
other outputs from the Agency in the coming period,
will provide just the kind of evidence that governments
will need for the practical translation of the principles of
the Pillar into policies and laws to improve the daily
reality of Europe’s citizens.  
While the Rome Declaration reasserted the conviction
that the countries of Europe are better together than
apart, Eurofound’s research findings bear out the
uneven pace of progress across the Member States, and
the fact that some are falling behind. They point to
disparities, for example, in employment,
unemployment and economic inactivity; in household
incomes and financial hardship; in the length of working
lives; in health and well-being; in the quality of public
services; and in social mobility.
We have titled our work programme ‘Towards upward
convergence’ to underscore that convergence of the
Member States will be a major theme for Eurofound
over the coming four years. Convergence was the focal
point of the Agency’s flagship Foundation Forum in
November, an event that brought together experts,
thinkers and social policymakers from across Europe to
present and debate different perspectives on the
subject. The Forum formulated a list of key messages for
policymakers to feed into the Social Summit two days
later. Among them were calls for good working
conditions for all workers to be the basis of competition,
to protect employment as a core social right, to align
the EU’s economic and social priorities, and to
mainstream the principles of the Social Pillar in policies
across EU, national and regional levels. There was also a
call for Europe to build the tools to preserve
convergence in the next economic shock.
Perhaps by the end of this four-year programme, we will
look back on 2017 and be able to confirm the
resurgence of social Europe, and say that it was indeed
a turning point for this Union of citizens and states, of
values and rights.
Foreword
Erika Mezger
Deputy Director
Eurofound
Juan Menéndez-Valdés
Director
Eurofound
1
Labour market
change
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The employment recovery is well-established in the
European Union, and the trends are positive across the
main indicators. More people than ever are participating
in the labour market – either employed or looking for
work – with the EU activity rate (for 15–64-year-olds) at
a record 73.5% in the third quarter of 2017. While this
means more job-seekers, unemployment continues to
drop steadily, falling from an annual rate of 8.6% in 2016
to 7.7% in 2017, as does long-term unemployment
(from 4.5% to 4%).  
Employment is at its highest level ever in the EU, rising
to 72.3% (among 20–64-year-olds) in the third quarter of
2017, even though economic growth (in terms of GDP)
remains moderate. Perennially problematic, youth
unemployment has also dropped nearly 2 percentage
points over the course of a year (from 18.7% in 2016 to
16.8% in 2017). The latest figures show that 11.5% of
young people in 2016 were classified as not in
employment, education or training (NEET), down from a
peak of 13% in 2013.  
Eight million net new jobs were created across the EU
between mid-2013 and mid-2016, representing a 3.7%
rise in employment. The countries that suffered the
worst employment hits during the crisis outstripped this
average: Ireland (+7.8%), Greece (+4.7%), Portugal
(+4%) and Spain (6.6%).  
But gains across the Member States continue to be
unbalanced. Employment has shifted from south to
north, with Germany and the UK accounting for most of
the new jobs (net of jobs lost) created in the EU between
2008 and 2016, while most of the jobs lost in Greece and
Spain in this period have not yet been recovered. And
the crisis has left a legacy of workers increasingly
distant from the labour market. Almost half of the EU
unemployed, or 9.5 million people, are long-term
unemployed and the majority (around 6 million) have
been so for more than two years. Nearly half of
long-term unemployed young people have been jobless
for more than two years. There is a real risk of
unemployment becoming entrenched among these
workers – the longer they are without work, the harder
it will be for them to regain it.
Changing composition
across sectors
While employment has now surpassed the pre-crisis
level, the employment landscape has altered over 10
years. The workforce has been significantly reallocated
across the broad sectors of manufacturing,
construction, services and primary industry (comprising
agriculture and mining, mainly). Figures from 2016 show
The tide is rising, are all boats lifting?
Employment and labour markets in 2017
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that employment in manufacturing and construction
remains very much reduced in most Member States
despite three years of employment growth (Figure 1).
Conversely, employment in services increased in all
Member States, and this sector now accounts for 71% of
employment in the EU. The forces driving this
transformation are not identical across countries,
however. In Croatia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and
Slovenia, the services shift is a result of rapidly declining
employment in the primary sector, whereas in the Baltic
states, Cyprus, Ireland and Spain, it is more a result of
drops in manufacturing and construction employment.
Changing composition of the
workforce
The make-up of the workforce has also changed since
2008, as Table 1 demonstrates.  
£ It is older: the proportion of workers aged 55 and
over has risen due to falling youth employment
from 2008 to 2013, a reorientation of policy to
discourage early retirement and later statutory
retirement ages as a result of legislative changes.  
£ It is more part-time: part-time employment has
been increasing steadily, even during the recession,
alongside a parallel decline in full-time
employment.  
£ It is more female, mainly as a result of job losses in
male-dominated sectors but also associated with
the expansion of services and the rising share of
part-time work.  
£ It is more high-skilled and white-collar, reflecting
the expansion of the services sector, an increasing
share of employment in occupations requiring
higher skills, and the replacement of retiring
workers by a younger, better-educated cohort.    
Figure 1: Percentage point change in composition of employment, by Member State and broad sector
(2008 Q2–2016 Q2)       
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey (Eurofound calculations)
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Table 1: Statistics on EU labour force composition     
2016
(%)
Change 2008–2016
(percentage points)
Older worker (55+ years) share of
employment 18.6 +4.6
Part-time share of employment 20.5 +2.3
Female employment rate 61.4 +2.5
High-skilled white collar worker
share of employment 41.0 +1.8
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey
(Eurofound calculations)
Shift towards top-paying jobs
The greater demand for higher-skilled workers is
apparent when the growth in employment is broken
down according to pay category. This exercise shows
that employment has risen most in higher-paid jobs
since before the millennium, and during the crisis only
the highest-paid jobs saw net employment growth.
Since the recovery, as Figure 2 illustrates, employment
has increased across all pay categories. It has grown
least in the mid–low-paid category, typified by jobs such
as agricultural worker and semi-skilled trades worker.
But employment growth remains weighted in favour of
the highest-paying jobs, such as ICT and health
professionals.
Different patterns emerge when the data for individual
countries are analysed. For instance, big Member States
such as Germany, Poland and the UK as well as Sweden
and Portugal conform to the skew towards top-paying
jobs (Figure 3a). But most of the new jobs in Hungary,
Ireland, Latvia and the Netherlands over the three-year
period are in the low-paying categories (Figure 3b).
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Figure 3: Employment change (in thousands) by job-wage quintile, selected Member States, 2013 Q2–2016 Q2    
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey and Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations)
0
1
2
Lowest 
paid
Mid-paid Highest
paid
Mid–low-
paid
Mid–high-
paid
Figure 2: Employment change (% per annum) by
job-wage quintile, EU, 2013–2016
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey  and Structure of
Earnings Survey (Eurofound calculations) 
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Read more
Labour market change: Occupational change and wage
inequality – European Jobs Monitor 2017
European Jobs Monitor data visualisation
eurofound.link/ef1710
eurofound.link/ejm
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Despite more people being in work than ever before, the
EU still does not generate enough work for those
seeking it. The 19 million people who are unemployed
and actively looking for work are evidence of this, as are
the 3 million who have given up looking for work
because they think no work is available (the
‘discouraged workers’ – more on this group on p. 14).
Then add to that the 10 million people who are working
part-time but who want to work full time, a status
known as ‘involuntary part-time’.
Part-time work is rising in step with the growth of
services in the economy, many subsectors of which
require more diversified and flexible working-time
arrangements from their workforces than the traditional
nine to five. One-fifth of jobs in the EU are now
part-time. And while undoubtedly part-time options
offer many workers a welcome means of combining
work with familial or other commitments, other
part-timers want to work full time – around a quarter of
part-timers, in fact.  
Full-time jobs prove elusive
When surveyed, two-thirds of this group said they are
working part-time because they cannot find a full-time
job. Hence, their desired weekly working hours tend to
be much closer to full-time working hours than to the
average weekly hours of other part-time workers.
Figure 4 shows the large gap (in pale blue) between the
usual working hours and the desired working hours of
involuntary part-timers. For workers with very short
hours, the gap is very large, but it decreases as the
actual number of hours worked increases. Those who
work fewer than 5 hours per week would like to work
between 24 and 28 hours, while those who work
18 hours or more per week would prefer to work
34–40 hours.  
Involuntary part-time does not appear to be linked to
the prevalence of part-time working in a country: in
countries where high proportions of people work
part-time, such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK, part-time status is more likely to be
voluntary. It is associated, however, with poor labour
market performance. Involuntary part-time grew most
in countries where unemployment increased most since
2008 – Cyprus, Greece and Spain.
Prevalence in service
occupations and sectors
The phenomenon is concentrated in the lower-paid,
lower-skilled end of economic activity. Over half of
involuntary part-timers (57%) work in lower service
occupations, such as sales and service work, a category
that accounts for around one-quarter of total
employment. Managers, on the other hand, are much
less likely to be working part-time, but if they are, it is
less likely to be involuntarily. Domestic employment,
working for householders, is the sector where workers
are most likely to be involuntarily part-time.
While more women than men work part-time, men are
more likely to be doing so against their preference. This
disproportionately high male share of involuntary
part-timers is concentrated in the services sector,
especially among those working in retail and the
accommodation and food services sectors, both of
which are predominantly female-employing sectors.  
Involuntary part-time: 
A blight on the labour market 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
H    
Figure 4: Gap between desired and actual hours of
work of involuntary part-timers, EU, 2015
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey
(Eurofound calculations) 
Detrimental impacts
A defence of this status may be that involuntary
part-timers at least have a foot on the employment
ladder, a better position from which to secure a
full-time job than unemployment – a similar argument,
in fact, to that used to defend temporary jobs. However,
alongside temporary workers, this group are losers in a
segmented labour market, with low rates of transition
to jobs with better hours, security or average pay.
Underemployment may also give rise to the social ills
associated with joblessness, such as depression, low
self-esteem and alcohol abuse. As the next section
highlights, close to a third of this group is also at risk of
in-work poverty. 
Read more
Labour market change: Estimating labour market slack
in the European Union
Visiting Eurofound
On 13 January, Eurofound welcomed
Enrique Calvet Chambon, MEP (front row,
centre), to its premises in Dublin. The
European Parliament’s rapporteur on the
revision of Eurofound’s Founding
Regulation, Mr Calvet Chambon met with the
Agency’s Director, Juan Menéndez-Valdés
(front row, left) and Deputy Director
Erika Mezger (front row, right), as well as
senior staff. In August 2016, the European
Commission made a Proposal to revise
Eurofound’s Founding Regulation in order to
align certain provisions of the existing
Regulation governing Eurofound with the
Common Approach on Decentralised
Agencies, as well as to update the objectives
and tasks of Eurofound.
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Underemployment puts workers at significant risk of
poverty. In fact, as Figure 5 illustrates, involuntary
part-timers are the group of workers at highest risk of
in-work poverty, followed by self-employed workers
who do not have staff. Poverty risk among full-time
workers, on the other hand, is low. While work is a
significant protection against poverty – most of the
76 million adults at risk of poverty in the EU are not in
work – such statistics demonstrate that having work is
not in itself a guarantee of financial security. The latest
Eurostat figures estimate that 10% of workers are at risk
of poverty.  
Low pay clearly is implicated in the problem, but it is
not usually the sole cause. While most people at risk of
in-work poverty are poorly paid, relatively few low-paid
workers are among the working poor. The work
intensity of the household – the amount of hours
worked by the adults in the household – is another
important factor; low work intensity drives up the risk of
poverty in all EU countries (Figure 6). Hence, the greater
prevalence among part-time workers and the
self-employed, who are more often underemployed.  
The third critical factor is number of dependants in the
household. Low pay will have a different impact in a
household with two earners where the secondary
earner is low-paid, compared with a household with a
single low-paid earner and the same number of
dependants. In fact, where there is a secondary earner,
their income may be sufficient to keep a family above
the poverty line, illustrating the importance of being
able to pool different sources of income within a
household.  
In-work poverty increased during the crisis – 8% of
workers were estimated to be at risk in 2007,
2 percentage points lower than in 2014. Depressed
wages, cuts in working hours and job losses among
earners in a household all exacerbated financial
hardship. But the dynamics are complex, which makes it
difficult to establish the extent to which workers’ living
standards have changed. Poverty is a relative concept,
and Eurostat calculates risk of poverty using a relative
measure based on median income. So as incomes fall,
people may be declassified as working poor without
ever seeing an improvement in their material
circumstances.
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Workers at risk of poverty
Figure 5: Proportion of workers at risk of in-work poverty, by employment status, EU, 2014     
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Standards, 2014
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Addressing in-work poverty has not, to date, been a
policy priority for governments, which tend to
concentrate on tackling poverty in general and focus on
getting people into work. While employment is
recognised as a key route out of poverty, attention also
needs to be paid to the incomes of workers once they
are in work. The complexity of the problem is partially
to blame for its neglect, as is the complexity of dealing
with it. Standard interventions by the state to raise
income from work often prove to be inadequate. For
instance, a minimum wage may be sufficient to protect
a single person from poverty but not a single earner
with a family to support. Redistributive measures may
also fall short. Reducing income tax, for instance, may
have little impact, as the working poor already pay very
little tax. In-work benefits and tax credits generally have
a positive impact, but these need to be well-designed –
for instance, an in-work benefit to one earner in a
household should not discourage a potential second
earner from seeking work. In addition, cuts to  in-work
benefits arising from reduced public spending during
the recession limited the ability of such measures to
provide redress.
Alongside direct measures to bolster income,
policymakers should consider indirect measures –
to increase household work intensity, for example.
Among these, access to affordable childcare stands out,
to enable women, mainly, to go out to work. It must be
targeted at the right group, however: workers with
young children and lower levels of household work
intensity and less stable low-paid jobs. Opportunities
for workers to improve their skills to secure better jobs
are also important, and training initiatives are
implemented widely, but such measures must reach the
working poor; often those in the most precarious jobs
do not have access. Steps to support the living
standards of households can also make a difference.
Around half of people classified as in-work poor say that
housing cost is a heavy burden, so housing benefits can
have an important role in preventing households from
sliding into poverty.  
Figure 6:  Proportion of workers at risk of in-work poverty, by household’s work intensity, Member States,
2014       
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Standards, 2014
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Read more
Quality of life: In-work poverty in the EU
eurofound.link/ef1725
The self-employed without employees is one category
of workers flagged as being at increased risk of in-work
poverty (see Figure 5 in the previous section). However,
one of the most striking features of the self-employed
labour force in recent years is that it has grown mostly
in higher-paying jobs, especially in the top pay quintile –
representing jobs such as professionals in health,
education, law, accounting and ICT – while it has
declined in lower-paying occupations (Figure 7). This is
an alert to recognise the diversity of this group of
workers, which encompasses both the enterprising
individuals who start new businesses that generate
expanding circles of economic activity alongside
workers classified officially as self-employed but
dependent on one client and eking out a living in
precarious circumstances.
Amidst high unemployment and global economic
competition, the EU has been more actively promoting
self-employment and promoting the conditions to make
it a viable prospect. At the very least, it provides another
source of employment; more ambitiously, it fosters
entrepreneurship, which in turn creates jobs and drives
growth. But not all of the 32 million self-employed
workers (15% of the working population) are
entrepreneurial; in fact, not all want to be
self-employed, and not all are prospering.  
Overall, 60% of self-employed people say that
self-employment was a decision based on their own
preference, while 20% chose it because they had no
alternative for work. However, involuntary
self-employment rises to 24% among those without
employees, compared to 10% of those with employees.
More of the self-employed without employees also
report that they would not be financially secure if they
fell ill. It is worth noting that the share of this category of
self-employed is edging up.  
Diverse groups of self-employed
The dichotomy between those who have or do not have
employees gives some indication of the mix of
experience within self-employment but fails to capture
its real diversity. A more sophisticated analysis of data
from the 2015 European Working Conditions Survey
(EWCS) clusters the self-employed into five groups
according to entrepreneurialism, economic dependence
and economic sustainability (Figure 8). This gives more
insight into the different circumstances of those who
work under the umbrella term ‘self-employment’.
Two of the five clusters, employers and stable
own-account workers, comprise about half of the self-
employed and are generally doing well. Those classed
as stable own-account workers do not employ staff but
enjoy the same benefits of self-employment as the
employers cluster, such as economic independence and
autonomy in their work, and running bigger and
economically more viable businesses. These individuals
are more likely to be self-employed out of choice.
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The many faces of self-employment
Figure 7: Employment change (in thousands) by
job-wage quintile and employment status, EU,
2013–2016      
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey
(Eurofound calculations)
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Figure 8: Five clusters of self-employment, EU, 2015       
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey 
(Eurofound calculations)
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Workers in the clusters labelled ‘vulnerable’ and
‘concealed’ operate under much more uncertainty and
much poorer working conditions. Those in the
vulnerable cluster mostly work alone and are more
likely to be dependent on one client, with little prospect
of finding new clients. The concealed self-employed
resemble employees – having co-workers, working
five-day weeks and being paid weekly or monthly – but
enjoy few of the benefits of being an employee, such as
job security and paid leave. These two groups generally
lack independence and autonomy over their work, and
their earnings are low. Most of them are self-employed
for lack of a better alternative. ‘Bogus self-employment’
– discussed further below – is more likely to occur in
these groups.
The situation of the fifth cluster, small traders and
farmers, is more mixed. They are generally economically
independent, and incomes tend to be at the higher end.
They work long hours, however, and find it difficult to
take time off. For the most part, self-employment was a
choice but many describe the responsibility of running a
business as burdensome.
Extending social protection to
the self-employed
A big difference between self-employed workers and
employees is the difference in access to social
protection. In most Member States, the self-employed
have less entitlement to benefits such as
unemployment benefit, paid sick leave, paid maternity
leave and old-age pensions. Denmark, Finland and
Sweden are exceptions, providing the self-employed
with the same social protection as employees, for the
most part, since most the schemes are universal,
although some elements vary in depth of coverage or
the amount of benefits received. Other Member States
have a separate social protection system for the
self-employed; these systems tend not to be as
generous or wide-ranging as those for employees.
Social protection in another group of Member States
has some universal elements, such as healthcare, while
other elements are closed to the self-employed or
voluntary. Ireland and the UK operate the most
parsimonious systems, where social security rights for
the self-employed are very limited, mostly
complemented by means-tested benefits. Workers who
wish to have more generous protection must take out
their own private insurance.
There is broad consensus on the need to provide a
better social security safety net for self-employed
workers, and all EU countries are discussing the revision
of social protection rights for the self-employed.
Sticking points include how to calculate the
contribution based on self-declared income and what
social insurance should cover. The argument in favour
of schemes covering all workers has been lent more
weight by the European Pillar of Social Rights, one
principle of which states the right of the self-employed
to social protection under comparable conditions to
employed workers. The European Commission is
currently exploring a possible EU initiative on access to
social protection for people in all forms of employment
within the framework of the Pillar. As the world of work
is transformed by digitisation and as the employee–
self-employed divide becomes increasingly porous, the
basis for differential treatment of different groups of
workers is increasingly untenable.
Tripartite conference on OSH:
Safeguarding vulnerable groups  
On 26–27 April, the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the
European Union held a conference on the protection of vulnerable
workers, with the aim of promoting and raising awareness of risk
prevention to enable sustainable employment conditions. 
Eurofound research manager Greet Vermeylen addressed the topic
of the protection of self-employed workers, highlighting in her
presentation the need first to recognise the diversity of
self-employed in order to target poor working conditions and
precariousness among different types of self-employed. She also
underlined the need for improved social protection and action to
prevent employers from fraudulently contracting dependent
workers as self-employed.
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Labour market change: Exploring self-employment in
the European Union
Labour market change: Occupational change and wage
inequality – European Jobs Monitor 2017 
Working conditions: Fraudulent contracting of work:
Bogus self-employment (Czech Republic, Spain and UK)
Bogus self-employment
In theory, the distinction between employee and self-employed is clear-cut: an employee has a labour contract with
their employer, while a self-employed person has a commercial relationship with a client. Ambiguous situations arise,
however. They usually occur where individuals who are ‘contracted’ to perform work and deliver a product or service
in a self-employed capacity find themselves in a subordinate and dependent employment relationship, the same de
facto position as an employee. When this occurs with the intention to circumvent regulations, it is ‘bogus’
self-employment. Economic reasons are the main drivers. In the Czech Republic, for instance, employers use bogus
self-employment to save labour costs and to have more flexibility in managing their workforce – enabling them to end
contracts at no cost. Some employees accept this status because they pay less tax and increase their short-term
income. However, bogus self-employment, whether voluntary or not, deprives workers of the various rights associated
with employee status such as severance pay in the case of dismissal, access to unemployment benefits, and health
and safety protection.
The Member States have taken different approaches to dealing with fraudulent self-employment contracts, as the
following three examples illustrate.
Czech Republic: The Czech Republic’s Labour Code defines the criteria that qualify a relationship as employment and
provides that employment-related working activities can only be performed in the framework of a labour law
relationship. It thereby provides a guide for determining what should be regarded as a labour law relationship and
what should not, and consequently what could be characterised as bogus self-employment.
UK: In the UK, no statutory definition of employment or self-employment exists, but a legal distinction is made
between a contract of service (direct employment) and a contract for services (self-employment); each of these comes
with a different set of rights and obligations, for both employers and workers. Nevertheless, the main characteristic of
the situation in the UK is the absence of certainty regarding the status, as the qualification of a relationship for
contracting work can only be fully established by a court decision.
Spain: In Spain, a statutory distinction exists between direct employment and self-employment. The two statuses are
regulated by distinct rules: the Workers’ Legal Statute (1980) and the Self-employed Workers’ Statute (2007). These
demarcate their own scope of action, establishing different sets of rights and using dependence and subordination as
the most relevant criteria to distinguish between the two. The Self-employed Workers’ Statute also introduced and
legally recognised the status of the ‘economically dependent self-employed worker’ (trabajador autónomo
económicamente dependiente, TRADE). The most important criterion to establish that a worker falls into this category
is when their income from a single client accounts for at least 75% of their total income.
Despite setting legal distinctions between employment and self-employment, each country faces challenges in
applying the law to effectively stamp out bogus self-employment. The regulations lack clarity, in the UK especially, but
also in the other two countries, which gives rise to legal uncertainty. Hence, implementation is difficult, and
enforcement bodies and labour inspectorates have trouble in effectively enforcing the legislation. In all three
countries, nearly all stakeholders have called for significant improvements in monitoring and legal powers.
eurofound.link/ef1718 
eurofound.link/ef1710
eurofound.link/ef17171
Around 90 million people of working age in the EU are
outside the labour market – just over a quarter of the
total working-age population. They are not officially
classified as unemployed because, while they are not in
paid work, they are either not seeking work or not
available for work, or both. It is typically assumed that
most of these people are inactive out of choice, as many
are students, retirees and homemakers dedicated to
domestic activities.  
Two subgroups within the inactive population are
classified by Eurostat as having some labour market
attachment (in other words, some desire to work): those
who are seeking work but not immediately available for
work and those who are available and want to work but
are not seeking it. Combined, they come to about
one-fifth of the inactive population. They do not figure
in the unemployment statistics, however, and when
unemployment was hitting new heights in Europe, they
remained below the radar of policymakers. But this is
changing as leaders and governments come to
recognise the imperative for all citizens to make better
use of their productive potential.
Discouraged workers
The first of these two groups – those who are available
for work but not seeking it – is the largest, comprising
close to nine million people. The main reason for
inactivity – given by around one-third – is that they
believe no work is available, hence they are often
designated ‘discouraged workers’. The traditional view
of discouraged workers is that they are a source of
reserve labour easily mobilised as economic conditions
improve. However, analysis by Eurofound concluded
quite the opposite, finding that their labour market
attachment is weak: 41% have not worked in the
previous four years and a further 28% have never
worked. They tend to have lower educational
attainment and also have an older age profile – nearly
two-thirds are over 40, which implies that they may be
deterred by real or perceived age discrimination or
obsolete skills. The research concluded that
discouraged workers resemble the long-term
unemployed and tend to be less, not more, attached to
the labour market than other inactive categories.
Willingness to work
However, whether one is interested in working depends
on the question asked. ‘Willingness to work’ turns out to
be semantically flexible when probed, and a jumble of
attitudes may underlie it. Even inactive people who
express no interest in working in response to specific
survey questions may be disposed to work under the
right circumstances – if shown a viable path into work or
how work arrangements or work spaces might be
adjusted to their needs, for instance.
The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) does not ask
whether the person wants to work but instead asks all
respondents how many hours would they like to work if
they were free to choose and adds ‘taking into account
the need to earn your living’, thereby including the
financial incentive to work. In response, 90% indicated
in 2016 that they would like to work at least some hours,
and over half would like to work full time (Figure 9).
Expanding the European workforce
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Figure 9: Number of hours different demographic groups would like to work (%), EU, 2016    
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
17
13
10
5
10
9
5
7
9
8
19
25
41
29
30
55
57
42
57
52
Retired
Long-term illness
or disability
Homemaker
Student
All inactive
0 hours 1–15 hours 16–31 hours 32+ hours
This is self-reported data that needs to be interpreted
carefully – for instance, what a student means in saying
they would like to work over 32 hours per week,
effectively full time – but it does show that there is a
willingness to work among large sections of the
population that have been traditionally ignored in
employment policymaking, and that it is feasible to get
some back into the labour force.
However, they do face many barriers. One of the big
barriers is care responsibilities – 34% care for children,
while 13% care for a relative – which keeps
homemakers, in particular, from seeking work. Many
also lack the skills that employers are looking for; they
have little work experience, poor educational
attainment or obsolete skills. Physical and mental
health problems also discourage job-seeking, as do
attitudes – many inactive people feel socially excluded
and that no place exists for them in the labour market.  
Does inactivity matter?
Why does this matter? Why should we be concerned to
reintegrate inactive people if they themselves are
unmotivated to take the steps to find work? For one,
relatively large numbers live with the distress of
poverty, and paid work would raise the living standards
of many. For instance, as Figure 10 shows, rates of
severe material deprivation among inactive people,
while not as high as among the unemployed, are much
higher than among full-time employed and the EU
average; rates are highest among inactive disabled
people and homemakers.     
A second reason, as explored in the section on quality of
life in Chapter 4, is that a person’s well-being is closely
associated with their employment situation: people in
work or education have the highest levels of well-being.
This fact reinforces the point: retirees as a whole have
lower life satisfaction (scoring 6.9 out of 10) than the EU
average (7.1), but well-being exceeds the EU average for
those retirees who continue to work (they score 7.2).
There is also the issue of social exclusion, which corrodes
society when it is persistent in social groups. People who
believe themselves to be outside society are more
susceptible to political and social philosophies that
resort to blaming marginal groups such as migrants or
ethnic minorities for their situation. The adherence to
such philosophies at a time when migrant numbers have
risen undermines social cohesion. In this context, the
rising appeal of populism in labour market blackspots
across Europe is a warning signal to policymakers. 
And there is a compelling economic reason: it threatens
the future prosperity of all. In the words of the European
Commission’s 2017 Employment and social
developments in Europe report, ‘the EU can no longer
afford so many inactive people.’ It goes on to note that
the impact of the declining working-age population on
future growth depends on the success of Member States
in bringing inactive people into the labour market.
Otherwise employment could stop growing very soon,
after 2020, it predicts, meaning that the EU would be
dependent on productivity growth for any future
growth in GDP (assuming fertility and immigration rates
remain constant), and the picture for productivity
growth is not promising.
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Figure 10: Rates of severe material deprivation among active and inactive subgroups (%), EU, 2014   
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Standards, 2014
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While the statistics on youth unemployment are looking
much better, the crisis has left a legacy of 1.3 million
young people in long-term unemployment. This
corresponds to 5.5% of people aged 15–24 years in the
EU labour force who have been out of work for more
than a year (the definition of long-term unemployment),
which is higher than for the rest of the labour force
(3.9%). In addition, almost half of the long-term young
unemployed have been unemployed for more than two
years. Getting these young people into work is an urgent
political issue, given the harm that protracted
unemployment does to their well-being and prospects.
The difference in prevalence across Member States is
striking. Close to 25% of young workers in Greece are
long-term unemployed, as are 20% in Italy and 13% in
Croatia and Spain, while long-term unemployment
barely occurs among the young in Denmark and
Sweden (Figure 11).
Long-term youth unemployment:
Immediate and lasting damage 
Figure 11: Percentage of young people in long-term unemployment, Member States, 2016   
Note: 15–24 years age group
Source: European Uuion Labour Force Survey, 2017
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Poor education a decisive factor
According to Eurofound’s analysis of EU-LFS data, two
key factors increase the likelihood of a young person
being jobless for a protracted period.
£ The first is poor educational attainment, although a
good education is less likely to protect young
people in Mediterranean countries from becoming
long-term unemployed.  
£ Lack of work experience is also a strong influential
factor.  
Damage to well-being 
Some findings from the 2016 EQLS illustrate the
damaging effect of long-term unemployment on the
well-being of the young. These data, in this case for
18–29-year-olds, show that those who are long-term
unemployed rate their life satisfaction lower than young
people who are employed, in education or short-term
unemployed (Figure 12). They are also significantly less
happy than other young people and less optimistic
about the future. And their scores on all three measures
have fallen since 2011.
Feelings of social exclusion in this age group are also
highest among the long-term unemployed (Figure 13).
And they have the lowest scores on the World Health
Organization’s Mental Well-being Index (WHO-5), an
index scored from 1 to 100, where the higher the score,
the better one’s mental health.
This category also suffers greater financial hardship
than other young people. For instance, the survey asks
whether respondents can afford six items: 1. keeping
the house adequately warm; 2. paying for an annual
holiday away from home; 3. replacing worn-out
furniture; 4. a meal with chicken, fish or meat every
second day; 5. buying new clothes; and 6. having family
or friends round at least once per month. Based on this
measure, long-term unemployed young people are the
most deprived of the four groups, being unable to afford
2.3 items.
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Figure 12: Long-term unemployed youth: scores on
measures of well-being, EU, 2016 
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Figure 13: Long-term unemployed youth: scores on
perceived social exclusion, mental health and
deprivation, EU, 2016  
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Damage to future prospects
A big concern with protracted unemployment among
the young is its potential to damage their economic
security over their lifetimes. Are there long-term scars
that limit their employment prospects, the type of work
available to them, and their income? Analysing these
dimensions of experience, Eurofound found that the
impact on a person’s ability to find work tends to
disappear over time if they return to employment and
have no further spells of long-term unemployment.
Similarly, they are more likely to be working in an
unskilled job, but this effect tends to reduce with age.
However, the results did suggest a strong scarring
effect with regard to income. A person who has been
long-term unemployed in the previous five years will
earn 11% less than someone who hasn’t had a spell of
long-term unemployment, and while the gap lessens if
the person stays in work, this pay penalty persists
over time. 
Tailored approach needed
The high level of long-term unemployment among the
young in several Member States suggests that this is a
target group that has been missed by youth
employment policy. The Youth Guarantee, the EU’s key
initiative to tackle youth unemployment, aimed to
provide all young people up to the age of 25 with a
good-quality offer of a job, further education or
work-focused training within four months of becoming
unemployed or leaving formal education. Were these
young people not reached by Youth Guarantee
programmes, or have these programmes been
ineffective in securing employment for them? 
Previous research by Eurofound found that
programmes funded under the Youth Guarantee often
focused on young people who were easy to reach and
job-ready – who could take up a job with limited need
for training or other supports. This strategy, however,
fails to engage many long-term unemployed, who have
multiple disadvantages that demand broader support
than coaching and help with job searching. This group
needs holistic, individualised and young-person-centred
approaches that include counselling, mentoring,
referral to specialised support, tailor-made training and
job placements, as well as flexible and sustained
support. 
This is the type of approach adopted in Finland and
Sweden, where policy interventions are well-developed
and Youth Guarantee programmes are functioning well.
Both countries have very low rates of long-term youth
unemployment, despite their short-term youth
unemployment rates being above the EU average.
The pay-off from investment in comprehensive
work-integration measures is also underlined by a
finding from Eurofound’s research showing that higher
spending on active labour market policy measures –
training, job-search assistance, special placement
programmes and employer subsidies – is associated
with lower levels of long-term youth unemployment.
Long-term unemployed young people undeniably
present more challenges for labour market integration,
and clearly not all programmes achieve their objective.
The next section (p. 20) looks at some common factors
that contribute to the success of programmes that aim
to bring the people most distant from work back into
the workforce.
Visiting Eurofound
On 11 May, Eurofound welcomed
Nicolas Niemtchinow (fifth from left),
Special Adviser to the ILO on the Future
of Work initiative, to the Agency’s
premises in Dublin. In Ireland to
address the Future of Work conference,
Mr Niemtchinow visited Eurofound to
deliver a presentation on the initiative
to research and communication staff.
Also pictured are Deputy Director
Erika Mezger (third from left) and other
senior staff.
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Labour market change: Long-term unemployed youth:
Characteristics and policy responses
Working conditions: Fraudulent contracting of work:
Abusing traineeship status (Austria, Finland, Spain
and UK) 
Preventing abuse of traineeships
Lack of work experience, as Eurofound has found, is one of main reasons that young people end up in the long-term
unemployment statistics. But employers are reluctant to hire raw graduates who are still some distance from having
the necessary work-related skills to fulfil the responsibilities of a full-time job. Traineeships, by combining education
and training with some work experience, can provide that essential half-way house between young job-seekers and
employers, and have become an important way into the labour market for young people across Europe. The European
Commission is actively promoting traineeship programmes as a political response to persistent high youth
unemployment rates – within the national Youth Guarantee initiatives, for instance.
It is essential, however, that the distinction between a traineeship and regular work is clear: requiring trainees to carry
out regular work without an educational or formative dimension amounts to fraud. A traineeship that is defined as an
education programme including work experience is not covered by labour law and collective bargaining provisions in
some countries. So if trainees perform regular work, they will do so without enjoying most of the rights associated
with employee status in terms of pay, working time and so on.
Nevertheless, an employer may contest accusations of fraud because the border between work-related training and
regular work is blurred, as in many cases trainees are supposed to carry out tasks that are related to a proper
employment relationship. Legal uncertainty over what qualifies as a traineeship and what does not is an enabling
factor in fraudulent practices. In addition, traineeships are not covered by employment regulations in some countries.
More action is needed from governments to ensure that traineeships are well-defined and regulated, and include the
specification of the learning content, the distribution of learning and working time, and the length and maximum
number of traineeships that an organisation can host and an intern take up. 
Enforcement authorities are being aided by the recent development of websites in countries such as Austria and Spain
where trainees can report companies engaging in apparently exploitative practices. If it does seem that a company is
fraudulently using traineeships, they are reported to the authorities.
eurofound.link/ef1729
eurofound.link/ef17175 
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Even with improving economies and more job
opportunities, it is a considerable task to bring people
who are distant from the labour market – be they NEET,
long-term unemployed, generally economically inactive
or specifically a discouraged worker – back into work.
Assuming that it is simply a matter of extending
employment activation programmes to a wider
constituency is an ingredient for failure. The needs of
these jobless groups go far beyond assistance with job
matching and job searches. They are hard to reach, they
have many obstacles to overcome, and they need
intensive support. 
Nevertheless, the Member States are giving more
attention to these labour-market bystanders and
putting more efforts into introducing or reintroducing
them to the world of work, both by mobilising
government bodies and agencies and by enlisting
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that provide
relevant services. Eurofound, over several research
projects, has documented policies and measures to
‘reactivate’ people who have lost touch with the labour
market. While rigorous evaluations of policies are
scarce, some pivotal factors for success repeatedly
emerge from these studies; they include
comprehensiveness, individualisation and employer
engagement.
Comprehensiveness
Willingness to work is just a starting point for
reactivation. Multiple deterrents deflect non-
participants from the job market, so any response has
to be multifaceted. Before the practicalities of getting a
job can be addressed, people’s self-confidence and
motivation need to be built up and sustained so that
they develop the psychological resilience to stay the
course. Their trust has to be strengthened, as they may
have had previous bad experiences with state
institutions. 
Then the supports have to be put in place to enable
them to get and hold down a job. These groups may
have low educational attainment, poor or obsolete
skills, or limited work experience, so training and job
placement programmes are needed to improve their
employability. People for whom care responsibilities
prevent them from working need support for childcare.
People who live far from training centres or workplaces
may need support for transport or accommodation
costs. People with disabilities need vocational
rehabilitation programmes to help equip them for the
world of work.  It is only when people are job-ready
following such interventions that job search and job
assistance programmes should kick in to help people
find and secure suitable jobs. But the need for support
might not end there. Individuals who are particularly
vulnerable often need counselling and coaching once in
a job. People with disabilities will often need to have a
workplace adapted to their needs and may also need an
assistant. 
Individualisation
The summary in the previous paragraph suggests the
wide range of support services that those outside the
labour market need, and these will vary depending on
the individual. This means that tailored advice and
guidance are essential for them to identify and navigate
the options available. Individualised assessment and
personalised plans are fundamental to establishing the
best pathways back into work. Feasible and flexible
plans help to avert drop-outs from programmes.
So, too, does having dedicated mentors or advisers who
can provide ongoing support when confidence lags or
the demands appear excessive. A programme in
Germany that helps disadvantaged young unemployed
to secure sustainable jobs, JA Plus, provides in-depth
assessment of participants’ strengths, following by
counselling and job placement. It emphasises tailored
mentoring in its approach, and support can last up to
21 months. Such individualised support entails high
costs but the presumption is that the costs of labour
market exclusion are likely to be higher in the long run.
Employer engagement
All this work on the part of the state, its agencies and
NGOs is of limited value, however, if the corresponding
buy-in of employers is not forthcoming. And employers
are often disinclined to hire people with a poor
employment history. Decentralised programmes that
engage employers locally tend to have better prospects
of success. Ideally, employers are involved early, at the
design stage, so that programmes take account of their
needs alongside those of the job-seekers. Incentives,
such as hiring subsidies and payroll tax reductions
(discussed at length in the next section), help with the
financial cost of a new employee, but a sustainable job
that remains when the incentives ends must be the
end-goal. It is wise, therefore, to attach conditions to
such financial incentives to prevent abuse – for
instance, requiring the employer to retain the employee
for a certain length of time.
The difficulties with job placements must be
recognised, as illustrated by an evaluation of a
programme established by the Municipality of
Amsterdam (the Perspectiefbanen programme), whose
Increasing employment: Supply side
aim was to place long-term inactive people with
employers. This evaluation noted that the municipality
found it hard to identify applicants with a realistic
chance of success, and it managed to place just 14 of
115 original candidates. The employers involved
reported problems such as lack of motivation, negative
attitude towards work and not showing up for work. For
employers, factors such as motivation, suitability and
ability to learn are ultimately more important than
incentives.
Doubts persist around the effectiveness of initiatives to
reactivate people outside the labour market, and the
absence of comprehensive evaluations does nothing to
attenuate such doubts. But a remark by the UK charity
Disability Rights stating that the Access to Work
programme is ‘the only government disability
employment programme that is proven to be effective’
may be taken to provide anecdotal evidence that such
programmes can be successful. The charity goes on to
criticise the programme for serving just 35,000 people
annually in a population of 3.3 million disabled, which if
nothing else illustrates the extent to which successful
programmes may have to be scaled up to achieve
adequate levels of reactivation. 
Read more
Quality of life: Reactivate – Employment opportunities
for economically inactive people
Labour market change: Long-term unemployed youth:
Characteristics and policy responses
eurofound.link/ef1728
eurofound.link/ef1729
25th European Social Services Conference: ‘Transforming lives
through innovation and technology’  
The 25th European Social Services Conference, held on 26–28 June in Valletta
and organised by the European Social Network in cooperation with the Maltese
Presidency of the Council, addressed the theme ‘Transforming lives through
innovation and technology’. Eurofound ran a workshop entitled ‘Work and
employment in the digital age – the inclusion of those furthest from the labour
market’, which singled out for discussion some innovative initiatives to
reintegrate inactive groups into the labour market. The challenges associated
with their implementation as well as their outcomes were examined, alongside
the perspectives of the service providers and the end-users. Eurofound’s report
Reactivate: Employment opportunities for economically inactive people provides
a detailed analysis of this topic.
RESEARCH REPORT
Reactivate: Employment opportunities
for economically inactive people
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One approach to increasing employment is to equip
those who are not in work with the necessary
capabilities and social supports to secure a job. The
concomitant is that sufficient jobs must be available to
absorb these job-seekers; at present, the supply of
labour outstrips demand. However, reducing taxes on
labour for employers or offering them employment
incentives might induce employers to hire more
workers. 
Labour taxes make up a substantial part of labour costs
in all developed countries. The size of labour taxation is
typically measured by the ‘tax wedge’, which is the sum
of the taxes and social security contributions paid by
both the employer and employee. The tax wedge varies
widely among EU countries, from around 50% of the
total labour cost of an employee earning the average
wage in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary
and Italy to around 30% or less in Ireland, Malta and
the UK.
Since the start of the crisis, European policymakers
have urged Member States to reduce non-wage labour
costs as a means of boosting employment. Given that
such reforms have had to be budget neutral at a time of
severe public spending restrictions, the Commission has
argued in favour of shifting taxes away from labour to
other sources such as property, consumption and
resource use. The country-specific recommendations
that accompany the European Semester have echoed
this argument. 
The crucial question is whether reducing the tax wedge
has an effect on employment, one that Eurofound set
about answering. Researchers analysed 68 studies
evaluating policy interventions in 19 European
countries that reduced social security contributions or
other payroll taxes (or offered hiring subsidies, because
these have a functionally equivalent impact). While the
results showed that measures have some success, the
full picture is complex and provides few easy answers
for policymakers.
£ Most evaluations (59%) found that reduced labour
taxes had a significant positive impact on
employment, and in most cases, the effect was
strong. Policies that target a specific group are
more effective than general or untargeted policies.
£ The target groups that are most likely to benefit are
the long-term unemployed and those on fixed-term
contracts (moving them into permanent
employment); female, disabled and low-skilled
workers possibly benefit, too, although the
evidence is less robust for these groups. Measures
targeted at young and older workers do not appear
to be effective; neither are measures targeting
specific groups of companies.
£ Policies based on reducing employer social security
contributions were more likely to have strong
positive employment impacts than hiring subsidies;
similarly, policies that were embedded in a
comprehensive package of reform measures were
more likely to be successful than standalone
measures. 
£ The positive employment impact seems to last only
in the short term and to dissipate over longer time
frames.  
£ Faster GDP growth enhances the probability that
measures stimulate employment. This
unfortunately implies that successful policy
interventions are less likely when they are most
needed, in periods of recession and stagnation.
It also implies that they may be more effective at
times such as the present – with modestly
improving output and employment growth.
Such measures may have unintended consequences,
however. Deadweight losses (the creation of jobs that
would have been created anyway without the
incentive), in particular, could be considerable, which
means that public funds are wasted. Opportunistic
employers might substitute current employees with
programme beneficiaries. Policies can be designed to
limit such effects, however. Restricting measures to a
specific category of beneficiaries is likely to reduce
deadweight losses, while substitution can be addressed
by tying subsidy payments to maintenance of
employment levels. In most cases, employers’
obligations persist for a specified period after the
benefit has expired and can involve repayment where
the employment commitments are not maintained.
There is also the possibility that shifting the tax burden
to consumption, for instance, may indirectly affect
employment, which will tend to offset some positive
gains resulting from employer tax reductions. Such
countervailing impacts are not easy to estimate and
very few calculations have been made. The question of
whether the employment impact justifies the
expenditure has yet to be answered.
Increasing employment: Demand side
Read more
Labour market change: Employment effects of reduced
non-wage labour costs
eurofound.link/ef1648 
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Labour market change: Policy message
Employment growth beat expectations in 2017, with more people than ever before employed and active in the
labour market. It is important, nevertheless, to look beyond the headline indicators to see what is happening in
labour markets and why. Taking account of the numbers of unemployed, involuntary part-timers and inactive who
are willing to work – somewhat over 40 million people in all – the supply of labour currently well outstrips demand. 
This may change in the medium term, however, if the recovery that began in 2013 is to be sustained as the
demographic shift to an older population puts a squeeze on labour supply. This will likely increase the
opportunities for the underemployed to work the number of hours they wish to work, and in many cases, have to
work. The need to reintegrate the inactive who are willing to work into the labour market will be inescapable.
This population can represent particular challenges to active labour market policy, but Europe cannot sustain the
current size of the working-age population outside the labour force. Eurofound studies have emphasised the
need for governments to invest in specialised and individualised programmes to reorientate inactive people
towards work.
The long-term unemployed, the majority of whom have been jobless for more than two years, and discouraged
workers (the inactive who believe no work is available for them) are a particular concern. Despite the increasing
demand for labour, they are at risk of becoming permanently excluded from the labour market. New thinking is
needed on how to reintegrate these groups into employment.
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Industrial relations
and workplace change
26 Living and working in Europe 2017
Many long-established processes within national
industrial relations systems broke down with the
recession, weakening social dialogue in several Member
States. In the aftermath, the European Commission
called for social dialogue to be strengthened at EU and
national levels, emphasising the role of the social
partners in social and employment policymaking.
Since the European Commission launched a ‘New start
for social dialogue’ in 2015, it has stressed the necessity
for the European and national social partners to be
involved in the European Semester as part of the effort
to reinforce the social dimension in EU economic
governance. From the start, however, the depth of
participation of the social partners has varied
enormously depending on country. Nowhere is this
more the case than in the development of the National
Reform Programmes (NRPs) by Member States, which
set out national strategies to implement employment
and economic policies in line with Commission
guidelines.
Social partner organisations in most of the EU Member
States are formally involved in the development of the
NRPs, but the intensity and effectiveness of that
involvement varies a great deal. In some countries with
well-established social dialogue institutions and
practices, their contribution to the NRP is an integral
part of the overarching industrial relations framework
and runs smoothly, embedded into day-to-day
exchanges. But from the outset, social partners in other
countries have complained about the lack of sufficient
involvement, stressing the inadequacy and
inappropriateness of the procedures in place. They
argue that consultation is purely formal, that very
limited time is allotted for exchanges, and that they are
unable to influence the final version of the NRP. 
Reporting on the European Semester 2017 cycle,
Eurofound finds that there were no major changes in
the institutional structures and practices involved in
developing the NRPs compared to previous years. Social
partners in France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Slovenia reported some improvements in the
coordination of the process. No substantial change took
place in Hungary and Romania, where the social
partners criticised the failure of government to
sufficiently involve them. According to their feedback,
they are only informed of the process of NRP
development, but they are not invited to make a
meaningful contribution.
More time was allotted for consultation in the Czech
Republic, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and
Slovakia. Nevertheless, the lack of sufficient time for
consultation is still an issue, and it has been
acknowledged by all parties, both social partners and
national authorities in a large number of Member
States: Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark,
Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and
Slovenia. 
Social partners’ views were reported to be taken into
account in the final version of the NRP in just seven
Member States (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy,
Latvia, Malta and Spain), although national authorities
are keener to acknowledge in some way the
contributions made. Social partners’ views were
annexed to the NRP in Austria, Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden.
Consistent with reports from previous years, it is widely
acknowledged by both social partners and even the
national authorities in most of the Member States that
the participation of the social partners and their
contributions have a limited influence in the
development of the NRP. Malta is the only Member State
where all stakeholders agree that the social partners
have a significant influence, whereas in Hungary, all
parties agree that the social partners have no influence
at all. 
Social partners at EU level: 
The European Semester
Read more
Industrial relations: Involvement of the national
social partners in the European Semester 2017:
Social dialogue practices
eurofound.link/ef18028 
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A review by Eurofound of social dialogue at national
level in 2016 demonstrates its continuing role in
advancing social progress, addressing issues of
importance for society at large as well as the people
directly involved (Figure 14).
The topics addressed most frequently in national social
dialogue included the labour market integration of
groups whose participation is a challenge – such as
refugees and migrants as well as young workers – along
with issues around job creation and pension reforms.
Social dialogue also contributed frequently to changes
in wage-setting and in the regulation of taxation and
non-wage related labour. In a smaller number of
countries, it addressed health and well-being at work,
working time regulation, and the terms and conditions
of employment. Tangible outcomes – in terms of
legislation or public policy action – came most often in
relation to changes in taxation and non-wage related
labour costs, benefits, active labour market policies and
health and well-being at work. This reflects the
importance of legislation – as opposed to social partner
action alone – in regulating these fields.
Ongoing trilateral debates – between employers, unions
and governments – were most prominent in the field of
pension reforms, the labour market participation of
different groups, working time regulations, and skills
training and employability. These debates were ‘works
in progress’, where the dialogue had often not yet
resulted in concrete measures.
Joint social partner actions or bipartite or tripartite
agreements were fairly evenly spread across all of the
topical areas in Figure 14: there was an agreement or
action in at least one country for each topical area,
apart from pension reforms and work–life-balance-
related themes. It comes as no surprise that
wage-setting, being a core domain of the social
partners, was the thematic area in which most
agreements or actions were recorded.
Social dialogue in the Member States
Figure 14: Number of Member States in which a specific topic was addressed in national-level social dialogue
in 2016      
Source: EurWORK, Network of Eurofound Correspondents, 2016 
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Eurofound’s review also shows that there are serious
challenges to effective and meaningful social dialogue.
As Table 2 outlines, in many countries both the breadth
(the number of thematic areas to which social dialogue
contributed) and depth (impact in terms of concrete
outcomes) of social dialogue is limited or somewhat
superficial. In only Austria and Finland did social
dialogue contribute both to a high number of thematic
areas and result in a relatively high number of concrete
policy outcomes.
Social dialogue failed or was overruled by government
action in a number of countries, including Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia and Spain – countries with very different
industrial relations systems. Such developments
underline the importance of efforts to enhance the
capacity of the social partners to engage in meaningful
social dialogue, and the relevance of their full
involvement in such policymaking processes as the
European Semester.
Table 2: Classification of countries by breadth and depth of national social dialogue, 2016     
Depth
Low Medium High
Breadth
Low
Germany, Croatia,
Ireland, Malta
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia,
Luxembourg, UK
Medium
Spain, Hungary, Poland Cyprus, Romania, Netherlands, Norway,
Lithuania
Slovakia, Italy
High
Slovenia France, Denmark, Belgium, Greece,
Portugal, Estonia, Sweden
Austria, Finland
Source: EurWORK, Network of Eurofound Correspondents, 2016
Read more
Industrial relations: Developments in working life in
Europe: EurWORK annual review 2016
eurofound.link/ef1727 
Visiting Eurofound
A delegation from the Committee for International Social Affairs of Gesamtmetall (the Federation of German
Employers’ Associations in the Metal and Electrical Engineering Industries) and CEEMET (the Council of European
Employers of the Metal, Engineering and Technology-based Industries) visited Eurofound on 8 and 9 June. Over the
course of the visit, Eurofound researchers presented and discussed the findings of the Agency’s research activities
in a broad range of areas, including new forms of employment, innovative human resources practices, and
industrial relations.
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The EU encompasses a diversity of industrial relations
systems, these having been shaped by different
traditions, institutions and practices. These systems are
evolving in response to political and economic
developments; many were diminished during the crisis
as governments chose to act unilaterally. Against this
backdrop, Eurofound has created a tool to
systematically monitor and analyse how Europe’s
industrial relations systems have adapted to post-crisis
times. The tool comprises a dashboard of 45 indicators
derived from the four key dimensions of industrial
relations previously identified by Eurofound (see Box 1). 
Comparing industrial relations
systems across Europe
The four key dimensions of industrial relations are listed below, along with some examples of the indicators
within each dimension. 
Box 1: Four key dimensions of industrial relations
Industrial democracy
£ time resources for employee representatives
£ trade union density
£ employee representation at the workplace
£ direct employee influence in decision-making at
the workplace
Industrial competitiveness
£ employment rate
£ incidence of corruption
£ percentage of individuals with a high level of
education
£ percentage of R&D personnel
Social justice 
£ at risk of poverty or social exclusion rate
£ early leavers from education and training
£ long-term unemployment rate
£ Gini coefficient
Quality of work and employment
£ unemployment protection coverage
£ subjective workplace well-being
£ unsocial working time
£ lifelong learning
This dashboard of indicators was applied to the EU
Member States on the basis of the classification of
industrial relations systems devised by Jelle Visser in
2009 (see Box 2). While the systems have changed in the
meantime as a result of developments during the crisis,
and the homogeneity of these clusters has been
challenged, the classification provides a framework for
analysis that remains relevant. The results illustrate,
despite some limitations, how the different national
industrial systems have evolved, showing divergent
trends across countries and, to some extent, within the
different industrial relations clusters. 
£ Nordic cluster (Denmark, Finland and Sweden): organised corporatism
£ Centre-west cluster (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia): social
partnership
£ South cluster (Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain): state-centred 
£ West cluster (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the UK): liberal pluralism
£ Centre-east cluster (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania and Slovakia): transition economies (‘mixed model’) 
Box 2: Classification of industrial relations systems
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A summary of the results follow – for illustration, it
includes a radar chart based on the aggregated results
on each dimension for just one country in each cluster.
Nordic cluster
The Nordic countries record higher values than the
EU averages in all the dimensions. They also show a
high degree of consistency across values in each of the
four dimensions. This is even more pronounced in terms
of industrial competitiveness and quality of work and
employment.
Centre-west cluster
The Centre-west countries are more heterogeneous.
A consolidated social partnership in these countries
leads to relatively high scores on industrial democracy,
above the EU averages. Performance in industrial
competitiveness is also higher than the EU average in
most countries, and they achieve better outcomes in
terms of social justice and quality of work and
employment. 
South cluster
In the South cluster, performance across the four
dimensions tends to be worse than the EU averages,
with differences more pronounced in the industrial
competitiveness and quality of work and employment
dimensions. Italy, for instance, is much less competitive
than the EU average and it grows at a much slower
pace.
West cluster
Countries within the West cluster record values close to
the EU average in terms of industrial democracy, below
the EU average regarding industrial competitiveness,
and above the EU average in relation to quality of work
and employment and social justice. In the UK,
performance on industrial democracy is below the EU
average. Values are also lower than the EU averages on
several of the quality of work and employment
indicators, while a mixed picture of social justice
appears. 
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In the Centre-east countries, most of the indicators for
the four dimensions record values below the EU
averages, although some differences occur across these
countries. For instance, Croatia and Romania show
values close to or above the EU averages for several
indicators on industrial democracy. The Czech
Republic’s performance on several social justice
indicators is significantly better than the EU averages,
but it performs below the averages on several indicators
for industrial competitiveness.
The dashboard should prove to be a valuable tool for
comparative research, summarising the complex reality
of economic and social relations across the EU. The
results can be used to present a snapshot of national
similarities and differences, or to explore them more
deeply.
Read more
Industrial relations: Mapping varieties of industrial
relations – Eurofound’s analytical framework applied
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eurofound.link/ef1755 
Somewhat over half (57%) of companies in the EU
encourage their employees to participate in company
endeavours outside the immediate responsibilities of
their job. Companies do this in various ways, ranging
from sharing information and consulting with
employees – through staff meetings, staff surveys and
suggestion boxes, for instance – to involving them in
strategic and planning operations.
As one might expect, such practices increase job
satisfaction, leading to increased staff retention, less
absenteeism and better motivation – in short, improved
well-being in the workplace. Eurofound research based
on its European Company Survey (ECS) has found better
workplace well-being in companies that promote
employee participation than in companies that are less
committed to this.
What is less obvious is that such employee participation
might have an impact on how innovative a company is –
and ECS data confirm this also to be the case. In
companies where employees jointly take part in
decision-making, the likelihood of innovation rises by
7%. This is a strong argument in favour of systematically
involving staff in planning and decision-making, as well
as a lesson for the 24% of managers who see involving
employees as an obstacle to change. And knowing what
other practices might make companies innovative is a
good start to boosting innovation.
Innovative versus non-innovative
companies
Innovative companies differ in many ways from those
that do not innovate in terms of, for example, size (more
big companies innovate than smaller companies),
sector (innovation is most common in the broad
wholesale, retail and hospitality sector), and workforce
(innovative companies tend to have younger employees
and a higher proportion of women). The extent of
innovation also differs according to the practices that
companies implement in their workplaces, some of
which are shown in Figure 15; 48% of innovative
companies involve employees in decision-making, for
instance, compared to 28% of non-innovative
companies. 
It is these workplace practices that are of particular
interest to Eurofound in its project to describe the types
of organisational setting that cultivate innovation. In a
workplace landscape where technological change is fast
and ubiquitous, styles of managing and organising work
that were previously valid may not produce the
adaptability required to give life to new ideas. The
research set out to discover which practices have the
most influence on innovative behaviour and also
whether several practices implemented as a bundle
have an impact. The concept of innovation was
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Nurturing innovation at work
Figure 15: Percentage of innovative and non-innovative companies engaging in various workplace practices,
EU, 2013      
Source: European Company Survey, 2013 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Employees involved
in decision-making 
More than 40% of employees have
university degrees
Variable pay schemes in placeTraining for employees
Monitoring of production quality
or developments outside the
company
No innovation Innovation
broadened beyond innovation in products and services
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doing business. 
Drivers of innovation
The single most important driver of innovation that
emerged in this research is the practice of monitoring
the quality of internal production or external ideas or
technological developments; this increases the
probability of innovation by 9%. Collaboration with
other organisations or outsourcing production is also
linked to innovation, as is a certain degree of worker
autonomy. Further analysis found that when these and
other practices, all related to how a company organises
its work, are implemented in bundles and combined
with practices that promote employee participation, the
probability of innovation is increased further. 
The explanation for this impact is thought to lie in the
opportunities for learning and knowledge-sharing
combined with the scope to act independently that
such practices give to employees. Workers absorb new
ideas when they are exposed to external developments
in their area of expertise and beyond, and when they
interact with other organisations. The ability to exercise
autonomy motivates people to use their discretionary
effort – the effort above and beyond that required by
the job – which makes this knowledge-enriched
environment a fertile ground for innovative thinking. 
Other practices, such as provision of training, use of
incentive pay and employing a high-skills workforce –
collectively described as human resource practices –
also boost innovation both individually and when
implemented collectively along with practices to
promote employee participation. Again, these are
practices that enhance the knowledge and skills in an
organisation, building innovative capacity, while
rewarding initiative and workers’ ability to act
independently. 
The role of social dialogue in the fusion of practices
should not be discounted. Antagonism between
management and employees hinders performance and
reduces well-being, creating an environment
detrimental to innovative thinking. Trusting
relationships, on the other hand, promote joint efforts
and an organisational setting that facilitates and
supports innovation. The research findings suggest that
such a setting includes a well-balanced mix of
workplace practices that lead to learning, build
motivation, reward initiative and optimise expertise.
Employee participation in decision-making seems to be
an essential component of this mix. 
Read more
Labour market change: Innovative changes in European
companies
eurofound.link/ef1707 
Industrial relations: Policy message
Europe remains a continent in which social dialogue matters, but it continues to encounter obstacles. At EU level,
the social partners in all Member States formally participate in the European Semester, but it is widely
acknowledged by both social partners and national authorities that the participation of the social partners is
limited and their contributions have little influence in the development of the National Reform Programmes
(NRPs). National authorities must endeavour to involve the social partners more effectively and transparently in
the NRPs, with a view to increasing their impact on the content. Improving the level of institutionalisation of the
social partners’ participation would aid this effort, as would setting up specific social dialogue structures to
involve the social partners more effectively in the process where these do not already exist.
National-level social dialogue in a small number of countries is making headway in achieving concrete policy
outcomes, including legislation and agreements, but in most countries, the input is more limited. A review of 2016
noted that social dialogue on specific issues failed in a number of countries, and legislation has been imposed
against the will of at least one of the social partners. In some countries, tripartite institutions had played a
significant role in industrial relations but this was derailed by the crisis; there is an ongoing effort to review how
these institutions function and to unblock their role in social dialogue. Overall, it must be concluded that while
there is some strengthening of the role of social dialogue within Member States, there is a great deal more scope in
most for extending the input of the social partners to employment and social policymaking.
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Working conditions
and sustainable work 
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It is not news that women take more responsibility for
the care of their children than men. According to the
2016 EQLS, 88% of mothers compared to 64% of fathers
in the EU care for their children every day. These fathers
estimate they give 21 hours a week to the care of their
children, while the mothers dedicate 39 hours per week.
This disparity is duplicated among working parents and
is one of the reasons why the working lives of women
contrast with those of men – in terms of working time
arrangements, occupational choices and pay.
Separating the data by Member State suggests that the
gender gap in care provision is highly influenced by
social and cultural norms. Figure 16 shows the
percentage of working men and women caring for
children or grandchildren regularly in the Member
States, ordered by the size of gap – ranging from no gap
in Denmark to a gap of 34 percentage points in Greece. 
The need to reconcile work and care may extend over
most of the course of a working life if it involves
both the care of children and of dependent adults.
Sharing caring
Figure 16: Percentage of working men and women caring for children or grandchildren regularly, by sex and
Member State, 2015
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015
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Visiting Eurofound
Eurofound hosted a delegation from
the European Parliament’s Committee
on Employment and Social Affairs in
Dublin on 20–21 February. The
delegation included Jean Lambert MEP
(Greens/EFA), Joëlle Mélin MEP (ENF),
Laura Agea MEP (EFDD), Javi López
MEP (S&D), and Lynn Boylan MEP
(GUE/ NGL), as well as political advisers
and representatives of the European
Parliament’s Secretariat.
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Figure 17 shows the care responsibilities of workers
according to age. The gender gap in childcare is wider at
younger ages, while for adult care, it is particularly wide
in the 50–64 age group, where a striking one-quarter of
women in paid work (compared to 17% of men) report
providing care at least once a week to an ill or disabled
family member or friend.
It comes as no surprise, then, that a higher proportion of
working women report difficulties in reconciling work
and care – 40% of women compared with 33% of men.
Among those working full time, the proportions are
higher and the gap greater – 49% of women and 35% of
men. 
The biggest differences in working time between the
sexes are largely related to care responsibilities for
children up to the age of 12 (see Figure 18). While the
working time of women declines during the parenting
phase, the working time of men actually increases
slightly.
Figure 17: Percentage of working men and women in different age groups providing care at least once a
week, EU, 2016
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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Figure 18: Average weekly working time across the life course, by sex, EU, 2015    
Note: IV = in couple with children under 7 years; V = in couple with children aged 7–12 years; VI= in couple with children aged 13–18 years
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015 
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However, both men and women would prefer to work
less for most of their lives, as Figure 19 illustrates. For
men, the gulf between their actual and preferred
working time is at its widest during the parenting phase
when work–life balance is most challenging: that is,
when they are caring for young children. The gap
between actual and preferred working time for women
during the parenting phase is much smaller, probably
because they reduce their working time in order to
balance work and care responsibilities. 
There are many reasons that fathers are working more
hours than they would like. The parenting phase
coincides with the time that they are most productive at
work, and the pressure to maintain that momentum can
make it difficult to cut back. Men may identify with the
traditional breadwinner role and social pressure
reinforces that norm. There is also the financial pressure
on households to consider; a reduction in hours that
brings a reduction in income is not an option for many.
Nevertheless, if working time policies took better
account of life course stages and allowed for more
support and flexibility, they could potentially enable
better sharing of care responsibilities and paid work
between men and women.
Working arrangements in terms of duration, scheduling
and location play a significant role in achieving
work–life balance. Implementing them does not place a
direct fiscal burden on the state, but it does require
efforts from a broad range of actors if they are to be
effective. Nevertheless, concerted efforts of this type
may be at least as effective as proposals involving social
insurance and could be complementary to them. And
while in some cases flexible working arrangements may
imply costs for companies, they may also enhance
productivity. 
Figure 19: Gap between actual and preferred weekly working time across the life course, by sex, EU, 2015     
Note: IV = in couple with children under 7 years; V = in couple with children aged 7–12 years; VI= in couple with children aged 13–18 years
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015 
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Read more
Working conditions: Working time patterns and
sustainable work
Quality of life: European Quality of Life Survey – Quality
of life, quality of public services, and quality of society 
Working conditions: Work–life balance and flexible
working arrangements in the European Union
eurofound.link/ef1720 
eurofound.link/ef1733
eurofound.link/ef1741 
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Informal Employment Committee meeting 
Robert Anderson, head of the Social Policies unit, addressed the informal Employment Committee (EMCO) meeting
in Malta on 10–11 April 2017, where he outlined the role that support structures can play in helping workers to
balance their paid work and family responsibilities. These include workplace policies such as flexible arrangements
and reductions of working time as well as state support through extending the availability of childcare.
Informal meeting of Ministers of Employment, Social Affairs, Family
and Gender Equality  
Work–life balance was the theme of the informal meeting of Ministers of Employment, Social Affairs, Family
and Gender Equality (EPSCO) held on 19–20 July 2017 in Tallinn under the Estonian EU Presidency. In his
contribution to the debate on flexible working arrangements and work–life balance, Eurofound’s Director,
Juan Menéndez-Valdés, presented findings by Eurofound on gender gaps in caring responsibilities and working
time over the life course, as well as the difference between actual and preferred working time for men and women.
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Workers in Sweden have the longest expected working
lives (41.3 years) in the EU, while those in Italy have the
shortest (31.2 years), a difference of 10 years (Figure 20).
Why the disparity?
This is due to many factors, including economic, social
and cultural differences, that interact in complex ways
so that the impact any one factor may have is difficult to
disentangle. Eurofound, nevertheless, has sought to
identify the influence that job quality might have on the
duration of working life. 
The earlier discussion on increasing labour force
participation noted that Member States need to bolster
employment as their populations age. One line of action
is to bring inactive groups back into the labour force.
Another is to extend working lives to reduce the
proportion of the population in retirement. The
statistics show us that although the employment rate of
older workers (aged 55–64 years) has risen steadily over
the past 15 years, less than half of this age group is in
work.
Eligibility for a pension is the main reason that people
aged 50–69 give for leaving work, according to Eurostat
data, which indicates the influence that national (and
company) policies around retirement have on decisions
to exit work. Member States have in recent years acted
to increase the age at which workers can access a
pension, by raising the legal and effective retirement
age and curtailing early retirement. While such
measures may help to alleviate pressure on social
protection systems, they are not sufficient to support
older workers to remain in work. There are undoubtedly
some retirees who have the capacity to work but have
chosen not to. Cultural factors, such as prevailing
attitudes towards working at older ages, exert an
influence but job quality plays a role, too. Good working
conditions make work more sustainable, meaning they
enable workers to build up and regenerate their
personal resources so that they are able and motivated
to remain in work for longer. 
Empirical evidence suggests that sustainable work is
built on working conditions that enhance health,
well-being, work–life balance, job security and
employability. Looking at these five outcomes among
the 45–54 age group in the 28 Member States may help
to illuminate why the lengths of working lives differ
between them. This is the life stage at which the
prospect of working beyond age 55 may become
undesirable, so the working conditions and the
outcomes they result in at this stage are crucial in
shaping people’s ability to work until the legal
retirement age.
Job quality affects the length of
working lives
Figure 20: Expected duration of working life (in
years), Member States, 2016    
Source: Eurostat, 2017
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Table 3 shows the scores for Member States on the five
key outcomes that make work more sustainable –
higher values indicate more sustainable outcomes.
Cyprus and Greece, for example, score exceptionally
well in measures of health, considering their ranking
more broadly. Portugal and Spain, meanwhile, score far
worse for employability and work–life balance,
respectively, relative to their overall position. The Baltic
states all show worrying degrees of below-average
health status, work–life balance and job security. The
relatively lower rates of job security in the Netherlands
and Sweden are notable (compared with their scores in
other aspects), while employability is much better for
employees in Denmark, Sweden and Finland as well as
the Netherlands and the UK.
The general pattern in these sustainable work indicators
broadly reflects differences in the average duration of
working life. Countries where working life extends close
to 40 years (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and
Sweden) tend to score comparatively better across
sustainable work outcomes, whereas countries where
working life averages fewer than 34 years (Croatia, Italy,
Poland and Slovakia) typically fare worse.
However, the correlation is low. Workers in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, for instance, have among the
poorest outcomes, but they are likely to remain in the
labour market as long as – if not longer than – the
average EU employee. Average working lives in Ireland
and Latvia are of roughly the same duration (35 years),
but there is a vast disparity between the two countries
when it comes to sustainable work outcomes. Other
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Table 3: Sustainable work outcomes for employees aged 45–54, by Member State, 2015
Ireland 91.2 74.1 92.5 86.7 34.1
Denmark 80.2 70.9 87.5 92 42.6
Netherlands 76.2 75 88.1 80.7 36.4
Finland 78.7 71.2 86.9 84.3 37.1
Sweden 81.7 67.3 86.1 82 39.6
UK 82.2 63.8 82.9 88.7 41.8
Luxembourg 76.8 67.8 88.1 94.3 21.9
Austria 71 70.5 86.7 93.4 24.3
Czech Republic 84.8 70 89.5 80.1 22.8
Germany 69.1 69.3 84 90 32.4
Belgium 73.4 68.2 87.7 85.4 31.3
Romania 61.9 67.7 91.3 89.7 33.2
Malta 70.4 65.8 83.7 96 29.7
Greece 93.7 67 88.1 80.1 13.9
Bulgaria 80 66.1 82.6 86.5 28.8
France 75.6 64.4 83.5 91.4 29.5
Cyprus 89.8 63.9 86.3 85.5 9.7
Spain 73 73.4 79.2 75.3 25.9
Hungary 76 67.3 81.7 82.4 25.4
Portugal 74.3 71.8 82.2 84.7 10.6
Croatia 76.2 66 84.5 81.8 16.6
Slovakia 66 61.8 88.2 93.5 17.5
Slovenia 69 68.9 84.4 74 22.8
Estonia 49.3 66.4 84.4 81.4 32.2
Lithuania 50.7 68.9 81.7 82.5 26.2
Italy 62.5 63.6 87.7 76.2 20.5
Poland 67.4 63.7 81.6 70.4 26
Latvia 46.5 64.4 83.8 73.6 27.4
Country Health Well-being Work–life balance Job security Employability
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015
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contextual factors clearly come into play such as social
attitudes and norms or policies relating to taxes and
benefits. For example, Belgium scores well on
sustainable work outcomes but has the fifth-lowest
average length of working life. This may be connected
with the fact that Belgium has the highest percentage of
GDP spent on early retirement, meaning many workers
leave the labour market early. So while improving
working conditions can contribute to sustainable work
and extended working lives, national institutions and
norms continue to play an important role in
determining who works in older age.
Read more
Working conditions: Working conditions of workers of
different ages
eurofound.link/ef1747 
Working conditions and sustainable work: Policy message
The results of Eurofound’s research on working time patterns in the EU constitute a strong plea for working time
policies that take account of workers’ differing needs over the course of their lives. EWCS data show that the gap
between people’s preferred and actual working time is widest when they are parents of young children and
towards the end of working life. At the same time, the lack of work–life balance is most pronounced during these
two periods. This means that the needs of workers vary over their life course and that the means available to them
to achieve a good balance between paid work and personal and family responsibilities may well be inadequate.
Better work–life balance has an implicit societal value that is linked to gender equality and quality of life. It also
has an economic dimension, with poor work–life balance hampering participation in the labour market. It has been
proven that more attractive working arrangements have the potential to boost labour supply for those who find it
difficult to reconcile rigid working arrangements with their family commitments. 
Good work–life balance also contributes to a decent and long working life. It is an important factor in making work
more sustainable and influencing individuals’ willingness to stay longer in the workforce.
Social Partners Lunch Debate: ‘Extending working life –
Career and flexible retirement’ 
Eurofound’s annual Social Partners Lunch Debate on 17 January 2017 looked
at ways to enable workers to stay in work until a later retirement age.
Participants discussed mid-career review as a means for workers at the peak of
their career to map out the subsequent stages of their professional life, as well
as various approaches to retirement that enable workers to reduce their
working time while remaining active in the labour force. 
Peter Scherrer, ETUC Deputy General Secretary, and Maxime Cerutti,
BusinessEurope Social Affairs Director, attended the event, offering their
thoughts on these options and contributing to the debate.
Member of the Network of EU Agencies
RESEARCH REPORT
Changing places: 
Mid-career review and
internal mobility 
Visiting Eurofound
On 12 January, Eurofound hosted the Greek Ambassador to Ireland, Mrs Katia Georgiou (centre). Eurofound
Director Juan Menéndez-Valdés (second from left) briefed Mrs Georgiou on Eurofound’s role in the EU policy
debate and the Agency’s research agenda for 2017–2010. Also pictured are, from left, Web Administrator
Dimitrios Zavaliadis, Eurofound Deputy Director Erika Mezger, Senior Research Manager Stavroula Demetriades.
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Three years after Europe began in earnest to turn a
corner following the financial crisis and ensuing
recession, the sentiment among Europeans as a whole
is that life is pretty good. Well-being levels are stable,
household finances are on a sounder footing, and
attitudes towards other people and institutions are
more positive. But the uplift has not been felt
universally, nor even nearly so. As always, for those on
the bottom rung of the social ladder, who bore the
brunt of the crash, the glow of recovery is most faint.
And divides between the Member States, prised wider
by the crisis, remain. Some highlights from the 2016
European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) provide an
up-to-date snapshot of these social currents –
aggregate improvements, but with countervailing
tendencies in different countries and specific social
groups.
Well-being
Life satisfaction, which is one of the basic indicators of
well-being, has remained at a steady EU average of
7.0–7.1 points (scored out of 10) over the four editions of
the EQLS since 2003, but it varies considerably across
countries (Figure 21).
Between 2003 and 2007, life satisfaction increased in
many eastern European countries in parallel with their
entry to the EU and the convergence of their living
standards with those of the older EU states in a time of
economic growth. 
With the downturn, life satisfaction decreased between
2007 and 2011 across many countries, especially those
hardest hit by the recession and the cutbacks to social
support that ensued. And while the recovery has seen a
rebound in some – Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland,
Malta and the UK – in most countries, life satisfaction
remains unchanged since 2011. Furthermore, this
measure has deteriorated further in Greece, especially,
but also to a lesser extent in Croatia, Cyprus, Italy and
Spain.
The good life? For many, but not all
Figure 21: Scores for life satisfaction in Member
States, 2011–2016 
Notes: 1–10 scale; numbers at the end of the bars indicate 
statistically significant changes in scores since 2011.
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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The EQLS is a pan-European survey of the
objective circumstances of people in Europe and
how they feel about their lives. It looks at the
many factors that influence people’s quality of
life, such as living standards, income, housing,
family and health. It also gathers subjective
views on topics such as happiness, social
exclusion and social tensions. The survey has
been run in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016.
Levels of life satisfaction are also quite different in
different population groups and always lower for those
under greater economic strain. One’s employment
situation, for instance, has a big impact: Figure 22
shows that people in work or in education have the
highest levels of life satisfaction. The poor scores of
those who have the weakest job prospects – the
long-term unemployed and those unable to work
because of ill-health or disability – are striking. In fact,
life satisfaction has deteriorated among long-term
unemployed since 2011.
Figure 22 also shows that the higher one’s income, the
better one’s satisfaction with life. And levels have
changed little in the different income groups since 2011 –
the only significant change is the drop in life satisfaction
among people in the second income quartile. 
While life satisfaction is static, optimism has increased
among Europeans. In 2016, 64% of people said they
were optimistic about the future, compared to 52% in
2011, and this rise is evident in almost all countries. This
is not a surprising finding, given that Europe in 2011 was
struggling with the severe effects of the economic crisis. 
Health
The health of Europeans has improved. In 2016, 7% of
people in the EU reported having bad health, compared
with 9% in 2011; it is also an improvement on the
pre-crisis figure of 2007 (8%). 
There are stark disparities in the health of people in
different income brackets (Figure 23). Overall, little has
changed for the top (fourth) income quartile – the 25%
of people who earn most – with about 1 in 20 reporting
bad health. In the third income quartile, self-reported
health has continued to improve over the past decade,
including during the crisis. For the bottom income
quartile, developments have been more volatile: the
proportion of people reporting bad health increased in
2011, but the percentage dropped in 2016 to a point
lower than in 2007. The data are more positive in the
second-lowest income quartile, where the proportion of
people reporting bad health has declined from 11% in
2007 to 8% in 2016.
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Figure 22: Life satisfaction ratings according to employment status and income, EU, 2016 
Notes: 1–10 scale; numbers at the end of the bars indicate statistically significant changes in scores since 2011.
Source: European Quality of Life Survey 2016 
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Figure 23: Percentage of people reporting bad
health, by income quartile, EU, 2007–2016      
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey 
(Eurofound calculations)
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Living standards
Fewer people are in financial hardship than five years
ago. Difficulty in making ends meet, a measure that had
escalated in many countries in 2011, had fallen back in
those countries by 2016 (Figure 24a). However, there are
a few exceptions (Figure 24d): difficulty in making ends
meet has risen particularly in Italy (by 9 percentage
points) and Croatia (by 8 points). And levels in seven
countries (Croatia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Slovakia and Spain) remain higher than before the crisis
in 2007. Bulgaria is the only country where the share of
people reporting difficulties has consistently declined
since the first EQLS, going down from 90% in 2003 to
63% in 2016.
Overall, more than half the population in 11 Member
States still say they have difficulties making ends meet,
which is marginally down on the 13 Member States in
2011, but still more than the 2007 level. 
A clear course for policy
The EQLS findings provide some encouraging evidence
of improving quality of life among Europeans, but not
for everyone. To adopt and extend Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker’s choice of metaphor,
the wind may be back in Europe’s sails, but many
Europeans are adrift on a silent sea. The EQLS results
highlight the areas policymakers need to act and the
people they must concentrate on as they endeavour to
save social Europe. Comprehensive implementation of
the Pillar of Social Rights, however, would set a clear
course for addressing the gaps in the social policies that
would really raise all boats.
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Figure 24: Trends in difficulties in making ends meet (%), Member States, 2007–2016 
Notes: A dashed line indicates that the change between two points in time was not statistically significant.
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016 
Read more
Quality of life: European Quality of Life Survey – Quality
of life, quality of public services, and quality of society
eurofound.link/ef1733 
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People’s lives unfold in the context of society, and the
strength of the relationships between people
themselves, within their communities, and with the
institutions of society have a strong bearing on the
quality of people’s lives. 
Trust in institutions
Trust in public institutions tumbled during the crisis,
reflecting citizens’ flagging confidence in the ability of
the establishment to protect them from the fallout. This
weakened public support for policies to deal with the
crisis, not to mention raising a spectre of doubt over the
overall democratic legitimacy of existing social and
political systems.
With the recovery and rising levels of well-being, public
trust has climbed in all the institutions that the EQLS
asked about in both 2011 and 2016 – police, local or
municipal authorities, legal system, news media,
parliament and government (Figure 25). The average
trust in all six combined, measured on a 1–10 scale,
increased from 4.7 in 2011 to 5.2 in 2016, a rise of 0.5
points.
In all countries except Spain, average trust in these
institutions is higher in 2016 than in 2011. However,
going back further, to 2007, shows that 12 countries
have lower trust in institutions than a decade ago. 
These increases in average trust were registered across
the board among all the main social groups. However,
the improvement was less than average for the
unemployed (4.5, up 0.2 points since 2011) and the
long-term unemployed (4.4, up by 0.3). It was also
smaller among students and those aged 65 years and
older (0.3), although both these groups have similar and
relatively high levels of trust (5.1 in 2011 and 5.4 in
2016). 
Trust in people
People’s trust in other people is more or less the same
as in 2011, with a rating of 5.2 on a 1–10 scale for the EU
as a whole, and is largely unchanged across the major
social groups. However, trust in people has grown
among the youngest age group, 18–24-year-olds (up 0.2
points), and this increase is evident across different
levels of education, which presages well for community
and social stability.  
But trust is uneven across groups, with less-advantaged
people expressing less trust than others. The largest
change is a drop in the trust level of the long-term
unemployed, which has fallen by 0.3 points since 2011.
And the trust expressed by people with higher
education (5.8) is a whole point higher than the trust of
those with basic or lower education (4.8).
Quality of society:
Trust, inclusion and tensions
Figure 25: Europeans’ average rating of their trust
in six institutions, EU, 2016
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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Social exclusion
The EQLS 2016 includes four items that aim to elicit
people’s views on the extent to which they feel
disconnected from society (see Figure 26). Following an
increase between 2007 and 2011, these feelings of
exclusion are back at lower levels than in 2007. 
These four items were subsequently used to create an
index of social exclusion, measured on a scale of 1 to 5,
where 1 is the lowest degree of social exclusion and 5 is
the highest. The EU average in 2016 is 2.1, down 0.1
points since 2011. A drop of 0.1 points or more is
apparent in 15 countries, most notably in Cyprus and
Latvia (both down by 0.5 points) and Estonia (down by
0.4 points). There has been no substantial increase in
social exclusion in any country. While these are positive
developments, social exclusion remains a concern. The
long-term unemployed and people who cannot work
express particularly high levels of social exclusion, with
scores of 2.8 and 2.7, respectively. In addition, over a
quarter of the EU population has scored over the
midpoint of 2.5 consistently since 2007.
Tensions between different
groups
Risks to social cohesion and stability can be captured in
part by measuring people’s perceptions of the amount
of tension between different groups. The EQLS
measures perceptions of tensions in several groups:
men and women; young and old; management and
workers; poor and rich; different racial and ethnic
groups; different religious groups; and people with
different sexual orientations. Figure 27 shows the
results of the data collected in 2011 and 2016.
Figure 26: Percentage of people expressing feelings
of social exclusion, EU, 2016      
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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Figure 27: Percentage of people who perceive tensions among different social groups, EU, 2011 and 2016
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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The most striking change since 2011 is the growing
perception of tensions between religious groups, from
28% of people perceiving a lot of tension in 2011 to 38%
in 2016. The proportion of people who see a lot of
tension between racial and ethnic groups also
increased, from 37% in 2011 to 41% in 2016.
In Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the UK, the percentage of people
reporting a lot of tension between religious groups was
higher than the EU average (38%) – possibly not
surprising in view of recent events and debates around
immigration and the Muslim population. In all but the
UK, perception of a lot of tension between religious
groups has increased by 10 percentage points or more
since 2011 (in the UK, the increase was 5 percentage
points).
The highest rates of reported tension between racial
and ethnic groups were in Belgium, the Czech Republic,
France, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands, where over
50% of people perceived a lot of tension. In Austria,
Estonia, Germany, Italy and Malta, the proportions
reporting a lot of tension between racial and ethnic
groups increased by 10% or more between 2011 and
2016. Tensions associated with both ethnicity and
religion were reported markedly less often in Cyprus in
2016 compared with 2011. 
Read more
Quality of life: European Quality of Life Survey – Quality
of life, quality of public services, and quality of society
eurofound.link/ef1733 
Visiting Eurofound
Germany’s Deputy Head of Mission in Ireland, Josef Reichhardt (third from right), was welcomed to Eurofound on
28 June, where he participated in a roundtable discussion of Eurofound’s recent research and its work programme
for 2017–2010.
Also pictured, from left, are Monitoring and Evaluation Officer Barbara Schmidt, Eurofound Deputy Director
Erika Mezger, Head of Unit Markus Grimmeisen, Eurofound Director Juan Menéndez-Valdés and Head of Unit
Barbara Gerstenberger.
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Good-quality, accessible public services form the
cornerstone of fair and progressive societies; they meet
fundamental needs (healthcare and social housing, for
example) and provide the means to participate more
fully in society (public transport, for example). They are
also a levelling force, in some cases providing the same
resources to all citizens, while in others, discriminating
in favour of those whose needs are greatest. However,
low standards, lack of availability and barriers to access
accentuate inequalities and increase the exclusion of
those who are already disadvantaged. 
Quality of public services
improves
Since 2007, the EQLS has asked people to rate the
quality of five public services in their countries –
healthcare, childcare, education, public transport and
the state pension system – on a scale of 1 to 10.
Comparing the total scores for the five services in 2007
and in 2016, almost all countries show improvements.
The biggest jumps occurred in Germany (up from 29
to 34, out of a maximum of 50) and Bulgaria (up from 22
to 27). The only countries where quality fell were
Slovakia (down from 30 to 28), Belgium and Sweden
(both down from 35 to 34).
Healthcare: Quality and access
This positive trend is reflected in how people assess the
quality of their healthcare services, where the average
rating rose from 6.3 out of 10 in 2007 to 6.7 in 2016 for
the EU as a whole. Healthcare elicits one of the highest
levels of satisfaction of the public services (Figure 28 –
in 2016, the EQLS added two more public services to the
questionnaire – long-term care and social housing). 
The improvement in quality since 2011 is particularly
evident in countries where ratings had been low, such
as Bulgaria (5.7, up from 4.7), Ireland (5.9, up from 4.9)
and Lithuania (6.3, up from 5.2). Unfortunately, the
rating of health services in Cyprus (5.1) and Greece (4.6)
remains relatively low, while the low rating given by
Latvians in 2011 has dropped further in 2016 (4.8, down
from 5.0).
Access to healthcare is problematic. People across
Europe have considerable difficulties in visiting their GP,
for instance (Figure 29). The most frequent issue is the
waiting time to see the doctor on the day of the
appointment; this is a problem for 42% of Europeans
(and 9% say it is very difficult), with particularly high
levels in Malta (68%), Greece (64%), Romania (57%),
Austria (54%) and Portugal (54%). Getting an
Public services for social good
Figure 28: Average EU ratings of seven public services in 2016
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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appointment also poses difficulties: over one-third of
people face delays, and one-tenth say it is very difficult.
This is particularly an issue in Greece (24%), the UK
(24%), Portugal (18%) and Estonia (17%).
Childcare: Quality and access
Access to good-quality early childcare services, for
mothers particularly, is regarded at EU level as an
important tool in achieving its goals to combat poverty
and to increase employment. Satisfaction with the
quality of formal childcare services, like that of other
public services, has risen in the EU, with an average
rating of 6.7 in 2016, compared with 6.2 in 2011. Quality
of childcare is rated highest in Malta (8.0), Finland (7.9),
Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden (all 7.7) – the same
five also had the highest ratings in 2011. Ratings are
lowest in Greece (5.5), Romania (5.9), Italy (6.0), Ireland
(6.1), Croatia, Bulgaria and Portugal (all 6.2).
Use of formal childcare services continues to be quite
limited in the EU as a whole. To examine usage, the
EQLS explores the specific childcare arrangements in
place for the youngest child in the household. This
analysis shows that only 29% of childcare for the
youngest child is provided in a childcare facility
(kindergarten, crèche, nursery, playgroup or day-care
centre) or through afterschool care. The main source of
childcare in the EU is the child’s grandparents, used by
36% of households. In 22% of households, another
household member, relative, friend or other informal
arrangement is used, while just 5% employ a
childminder with a formal contract.
Member States deviate enormously from this overall
pattern: for example, in Denmark and Sweden, over
80% of families use a formal childcare facility. However,
the proportion is below 20% in Croatia, Cyprus, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Malta, Romania and Spain. Family – and
particularly grandparents – play a major part in
childcare in southern and south-eastern Europe,
providing the main type of childcare in between half
and two-thirds of households in Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Romania. 
Local services
Local services such as banking, recreational areas and
recycling facilities also present problems of access for
citizens. There is, for example, increasing demand for
recycling facilities as environmental protection
becomes a higher priority. At present, nearly one-fifth of
people in the EU have difficulty accessing recycling
facilities. And big differences between countries are
evident in this realm, too: small shares of people
encounter difficulties in Malta (6%), Sweden (7%), and
Lithuania (8%), while shares are especially high in
Romania (41%), Bulgaria (34%) and Croatia (30%). 
Public services advance
social goals
Member States are responsible for investment in public
services, but in its policy mechanisms – including the
Social Investment Package of 2013 and the country-
specific recommendations of the European Semester –
the EU has emphasised the importance of good-quality
accessible services in supporting the goals of the EU,
such as increasing participation in employment and
tackling social exclusion. The European Pillar of Social
Rights reinforces the message, with its supporting
documents consistently highlighting inequalities in
access to welfare services, health and education. The
major issue, in many cases, is not the recognition of
rights – to adequate activation support, care services or
quality education, for example – but ensuring actual
take-up of efficient, affordable, sustainable and quality
services.
Figure 29: Percentage of people who experience difficulties in accessing a GP, EU, 2016
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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The idea of a marketplace in the care of the sick and the
elderly is anathema to those who believe that human
welfare should be the guiding motivation in healthcare.
Nevertheless, the private sector is moving inexorably
into the sector as the state little by little withdraws.
Based on the data available to its correspondents
across Europe, Eurofound has found that the number of
private for-profit hospitals, as well as the number of
beds they provide, has increased in most Member States
over the past decade, particularly in Bulgaria and
Romania. Non-profit provision fell during this period
across the 28, except in Italy and Portugal.
Rising costs associated with new treatments as well as
people living longer, often with multiple chronic health
conditions, is putting an increasing, and increasingly
unsustainable, burden on public healthcare budgets. By
introducing competition into the sector, policymakers
aim to contain costs while improving quality and
efficiency. But national health systems are notoriously
complex, and private providers insert themselves into
public health in several ways – through outsourcing,
public–private partnerships or change of legal status
from public to private, for instance. This makes it
difficult to assess whether the goals of policymakers are
being achieved. Nevertheless, Eurofound has provided
some evidence on the impact of privatisation in both
the hospital and care homes subsectors, looking
specifically at the effects on efficiency, quality and
accessibility.
Private sector in hospital care
Efficiency gains disputable
One potential area of efficiency gain for private
hospitals is in reducing the lengths of stay of patients,
which reduces costs per patient. Private hospitals have
been shown to have shorter lengths of stay, but it is
often because they tend not to offer complex
procedures, which entail much longer lengths of stay.
However, the way private hospitals are reimbursed can
have an impact on this metric. If they are reimbursed on
the basis of the number of days a patient occupies a
bed, it can incentivise them to increase the length of
stay. 
The number and complexity of procedures tends to be
lower than in public hospitals. By focusing on elective
surgery such as hip replacement, orthopaedic care and
radiology, private hospitals can standardise care
pathways according to best practice. This means a
lower risk of complications and enables treatment to be
scheduled. These factors help these operators to
achieve higher efficiency than bigger hospitals (usually
public ones) that provide more types of treatments. The
treatments offered by private hospitals also tend to be
more profitable.
But private hospitals can function efficiently only with
the support of the public framework. They commonly
have to transfer patients to public hospitals when
complications arise. Even though they are starting to
treat more complex cases, the expansion of private
provision is done on the basis of using the accident and
emergency departments in public hospitals as a safety
net; this reduces risks and costs. Patients are also
transferred when the care received at private hospitals
does not suit their needs or when affordability issues
arise. Private hospitals in Romania, for example,
frequently transfer patients to the public system when
patients cannot afford unscheduled treatments or
prolonged stays. 
Accessibility issues arise
The imbalance between private and public hospitals in
the treatments offered has an impact on accessibility.
By not treating the more complex and less profitable
cases, gains in efficiency are achieved at the expense of
accessibility for patients with complications. The
absence of services such as accident and emergency
departments is an indirect form of ‘cream skimming’ –
choosing patients based on characteristics other than
their need for care – leaving public hospitals to care for
patients with more severe conditions. It has also been
found that users from higher socioeconomic classes
seem to have better access to private hospitals. In the
UK, for instance, private clinics (known as independent
sector treatment centres, ISTCs) treat less complex
patients compared with the NHS, such as patients with
fewer diagnoses, patients exposed to fewer prior
procedures and patients less likely to come from
deprived residential areas.
Quality difficult to assess
It is difficult for the researchers to establish a clear
relationship between hospital ownership and the
quality of care provided due to gaps in the data
available from private hospitals. And this is one reason
for the lack of evaluations or studies comparing service
delivery in public and private hospitals. Data gathered
through patient satisfaction surveys usually focus on
non-medical aspects of services, such as food and
accommodation, and provide inconclusive findings
regarding the importance of hospital ownership.
Who cares? The private sector in
public health
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However, unscheduled transfers of complex cases from
private to public hospitals may lead patients to feel that
their condition worsens due to the delay in receiving
care. Public hospitals in Ireland have sometimes been
reticent to cooperate with private providers, leading to
patients being discharged from private hospitals and
then being given an appointment in a public hospital
rather than a direct referral and admission. Such
problems have been reduced (in some cases) by having
agreements between public and private hospitals.
What future for public hospitals?
Public hospitals continue to be the cornerstones of
national health systems, with a critical role in providing
the services that the private sector declines to offer. And
their role extends beyond treatment – they provide
medical education and research services, which is not the
case in private hospitals; a public–private partnership
hospital in Italy, included in the Eurofound study, is one
of the few private university hospitals in the EU. The
information available suggests that private providers
complement the services provided by the public sector
rather than replace them, particularly in areas such as
diagnostics and elective surgery. Eurofound’s researchers
concluded that having a more structured relationship
between public and private hospitals than on-the-spot
contracting could reduce the selection of more profitable
patients and the referral of unscheduled complex cases
to public hospitals. Greater coordination of information
on patients and staff is also required.
The public sector must also play the role of overseer in
national health systems. As part of that role, it needs to
facilitate the better integration of public and private
hospital services, establishing a repository of
information, complaints and good practices to which
both contribute.
Private sector in residential care 
According to the European Commission’s 2015 Ageing
Report, public spending on long-term care will increase
more than spending on pensions or healthcare by 2060.
Already the lack of availability of long-term care is an
issue across Europe – at the low end, 44% of
respondents to the 2011 EQLS in Denmark said that they
or someone close to them had difficulties availing of
long-term care services; at the high end, the figure
reached 86% in Greece and Slovakia.
Public–private mix
There is a big gap in the market for the provision of
residential care, and the Member States, in part acting
on recommendations arising from the European
Semester, have brought in reforms to ease the entry of
different types of providers to the sector to stimulate
competition and reduce costs. These reforms include the
introduction of mechanisms such as tendering,
commissioning, user choice, user fees and vouchers. At
present, the mix of public versus private is very variable
across the EU, as Figure 30 shows. Less than one-quarter
of care homes are public in Greece, Germany, Scotland,
Ireland and Italy; in Greece, there are only two public
care homes for older people. In Denmark and Latvia, by
contrast, more than 90% are public. 
Figure 30: Ownership of residential care homes in selected Member States, 2017 
Note: ‘Private’ refers to care homes where the information available did not distinguish between for-profit or not-for-profit status.
Source: Network of Eurofound Correspondents, 2017
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There has been a marked growth in private provision in
eastern Europe over the past 10 years, especially in
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, where the number of
private care homes has doubled, albeit from a low base.
Meanwhile, the number of public care homes is
decreasing in Croatia, the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Norway, Slovenia and the UK (Scotland), and
growing at a slower pace than private care homes in
Cyprus, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Only in Malta
and Spain have the number of public care homes
increased at a faster pace than private care homes.
Controlling costs
Despite the opportunities, the home care sector is
challenging for private providers. They have to perform
a delicate balancing act to contain costs while
maintaining quality of care. Cutting costs by decreasing
the quality of service is not acceptable to clients and the
public at large, but increasing prices may cause them to
lose competitiveness. Differences in the cost efficiency
of public and private care homes are in part determined
by differences in the types of resident. Public care
homes often have a higher share of residents with
health complications, who are therefore less profitable.
In some countries, private care homes control costs by
providing fewer specialist medical services such as
dementia care, which is a major issue when a high
proportion of service users are aged over 80. 
Specialised services demand higher numbers of nurses,
and differences in staffing levels also contribute
significantly to differences in care home costs. In most
countries where information about staff-to-resident
ratios is available, public care homes employ more staff
per resident, driving up their wage bills. Germany is an
interesting exception; private care homes manage to
contain staff costs because they rarely apply collective
agreements and therefore average wages are lower than
in non-profit and public care homes. Consequently, they
are able to offer lower prices and thus get most of the
contracts and service users. Non-profit providers need to
achieve high occupancy rates, with many resorting to
cost-cutting in order to survive economically.
Quality findings inconclusive
Eurofound’s researchers came to no unequivocal
conclusions about differences in the quality of services
depending on ownership, with results differing from
country to country. The results nevertheless indicate the
aspects of quality that may be affected by changes in the
market share of each type of provider. Some aspects in
which there were differences between types of provider
included: having a single room; hygiene; the residents’
choice of food and activities; attitude of staff; nutrition;
continuity of care; and preventive health services.
As private provision increases, the costs to users are
likely to become a more significant issue. Higher
co-payments may be demanded of service users, which
may be unaffordable for some. To avoid such an
outcome, alternative sources of funding for providers
must be sought. This may come in the form an increase
in public subsidies. Or there may be other options: in
Belgium and Italy, for instance, long-term care
insurance is being discussed as a form of funding.
Solutions are urgently needed, however, to avoid
deepening of health inequalities. 
Read more
Quality of life: Delivering hospital services –
A greater role for the private sector?
Quality of life: Care homes for older Europeans –
Public, private and not-for-profit providers
eurofound.link/ef1653 
eurofound.link/ef1723 
Report launch: Care homes for older Europeans 
The report Care homes for older Europeans: Public, private
and not-for-profit providerswas launched on 28 November in
Dublin, at an event opened by Jim Daly, Irish Minister of
State at the Department of Health with special responsibility
for Mental Health and Older People. The launch presented
new findings on the extent to which private providers are
expanding or replacing the public sector in the delivery of
services, and which assess how the private sector compares
in terms of efficiency, accessibility and quality.
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Informal meeting of the Social Protection Committee 
Eurofound was invited to present at the informal meeting of the EU Social Protection Committee (SPC) in Tallinn
on 18–19 September 2017. The thematic discussions focused on the quality of long-term care services and looked
at ways of measuring the effectiveness of community-based long-term care services and how to promote sharing
of good practice. The discussions took place in the context of the ongoing debate on the future of the European
Union and based on the Commission’s Reflection paper on the social dimension of Europe. Robert Anderson, Head of
Social Policies, presented Eurofound findings on the quality of long-term care services.
The structure of European societies changed dramatically
after the Second World War when economies boomed on
the back of a shift from industry towards service-oriented
activities. New white-collar and professional jobs
emerged, dissolving the rigidities of the old class
structure. Mass education provided a skilled workforce,
meaning that people drawn from all strata of society
could, potentially at least, occupy these jobs. Equal
opportunities for all became a fundamental principle of
democratic societies – backed up by the principles of
equal access to education and the jobs market.
It seems, however, that social structures are hardening
again. As the modernisation of economies subsides, fewer
new jobs are being created at the higher occupational
levels, and this is curtailing upwardly mobility. Looking at
three generations born in the 20th century, Eurofound
researchers found that the most recent of the three was
the least mobile and that social background continues to
have a profound effect on life chances.
Mobility across three generations
The research examined patterns of intergenerational
mobility across occupational classes to establish
whether people had moved into a higher or lower
occupational class than their parents. The three cohorts
examined lived through quite different periods of
economic and social change: the silent generation
(born 1927–1945), the baby boomers (born 1946–1964)
and Generation X (born 1965–1975).  
In theory, as low-skilled jobs decrease and
higher-skilled and services jobs increase, upward
mobility should be more prevalent than downward
mobility, while immobility – staying in the same class –
should decline over time as societies become more
meritocratic. 
The analysis bears out such shifts for the first two
cohorts (Figure 31). Upward mobility was greatest for
the baby boomers, downward mobility was more or less
the same, and immobility fell. However, upward
mobility has decreased for Generation X, while
downward mobility has increased and immobility has
risen somewhat. 
Social mobility: Going up? Or down?
Figure 31: Mobility patterns across three
generations    
Source: European Social Survey, waves 1–5, 2002–2010 (Eurofound
calculations) 
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Visiting Eurofound
Eurofound welcomed French Ambassador
to Ireland Stéphane Crouzat (third from
right) to its premises on 29 November.
Key subjects discussed during the visit
were the Agency’s work programme for
2017–2020 and its approach to
cooperation with national stakeholders.
Pictured with the ambassador are French
staff within the Agency.
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These overall trends mask differences in the mobility
patterns of men and women, however (Figure 32).
Separating the patterns for the sexes shows that from
the oldest to the most recent cohort, there was a
significant decrease in male upward mobility alongside
significant increases in downward mobility and
immobility.
Meanwhile, while the female baby boomers had the
most favourable mobility trends, Generation X were still
more upwardly and less downwardly mobile and less
immobile than the silent generation. 
These different patterns reflect how women benefited
to a greater extent from the changing occupational
structure. Most jobs in the growing service economy
needed a substantially higher level of education, and
women were often better educated and hence better
equipped to work in these occupations. Moreover, as
manufacturing has declined, men who in previous
generations would have worked in skilled blue collar
jobs increasingly slipped down the occupational ranks
into semi-skilled and unskilled work.
Social fluidity of Member States
As well as examining these patterns of absolute social
mobility, it is important to look too at relative social
mobility – the probability that individuals from different
social groups end up in other classes regardless of
changes in the class structure that happens over time.
This is also known as social fluidity and is an indicator of
the openness or fairness of a society. The more socially
fluid a society, the less important social origin becomes
in determining mobility. 
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Figure 32: Mobility patterns across three generations, by sex
Source: European Social Survey, waves 1–5, 2002–2010 (Eurofound calculations) 
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The social fluidity of European societies and its
evolution are very different, as Figure 33 illustrates.
(The values on the vertical axes are beta values; a
decreasing beta value indicates a decrease in the
importance of social origin as a factor in people’s social
mobility, hence increasing social fluidity.)
£ Only in Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Greece, the
Netherlands and Slovakia has social fluidity
increased across the three cohorts, meaning that
social origin has become less important over time.
£ In Austria, Bulgaria, France and Sweden, fluidity
increased from the silent generation to the baby
boomers, but then decreased with Generation X. In
Estonia, it decreased across all three generations.
£ In the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Spain,
fluidity increased between the silent generation
and the baby boomers, but then stabilised.
£ In Hungary, Ireland and the UK, fluidity remained
stable across the generations. 
As with the combined trends in absolute social mobility,
these aggregated social fluidity patterns obscure
opposing trends for men and women. In Germany and
Spain, for instance, social fluidity for men increased
across all three cohorts, but for the women in
Generation X it was less than for the baby boomers. In
the UK, the seemingly stable level of social fluidity was,
in fact, a movement towards decreasing social fluidity
for men in Generation X cancelled out by increasing
social fluidity – albeit at a slower rate – for women.
Across the EU countries as a whole, social fluidity has
decreased for men more than for women. 
If social mobility is to be improved, social investment
must be deployed to boost equality of opportunity for
both sexes – through, for instance, improving the
quality and coverage of early education, providing
compensatory funding for disadvantaged pupils, and
enabling better access to healthcare. Specific attention
should be given to reversing the decreasing life chances
among men born after 1964, whose prospects have
significantly deteriorated in many countries. 
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Figure 33: Member States with increasing and decreasing social fluidity patterns 
Source: European Social Survey, waves 1–5, 2002–2010 (Eurofound calculations)
Read more
Quality of life: Social mobility in the EU
eurofound.link/ef1664 
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Quality of life and public services: Policy message
The European Quality of Life Survey is a unique tool for measuring social progress in the EU. Its message from 2017
is that there has been progress on the three key areas of its remit: quality of life, quality of society and quality of
public services – though not in all countries and not for all social groups. Optimism is up, satisfaction with living
standards has increased and some other quality of life indicators are back to the levels they were at prior to the
crisis. Quality of society has also improved in several dimensions, with increased trust in national institutions and a
decline in feelings of social exclusion. Ratings for key public services have also increased overall. 
Nevertheless, signs of persistent inequalities remain, and people express insecurity over issues such as retaining
their accommodation and their income in old age. Disparities in quality of life are apparent among different social
groups, varying according to gender, age, employment status and income. Differences are also widespread across
Member States. Countries that scored high on most indicators in previous waves also did well in 2016, while
countries that scored poorly also continue to do so. All countries show strengths in some area, but multiple
disadvantages are still more pronounced in some. While satisfaction with standard of living has converged across
the Member States, over 50% of population in 11 countries still report difficulties in making ends meet. From a
different angle, Eurofound’s work on the widespread stagnation of social mobility across the EU illustrates that
there is some way to go before ‘equal opportunities for all’ is realised.
Policy action is needed to extend the progress experienced by many to groups outside the mainstream, and the
Pillar of Social Rights leads the way in that respect. The initiative aims to address the types of inequalities
uncovered by the EQLS, and understanding these is critical for implementation of the Pillar. The Social Scoreboard
that accompanies the Pillar comprises a list of indicators for monitoring the progress in its implementation. EQLS
2016 has findings that could complement the Social Scoreboard, as well as evaluating progress in implementing
the key principles of the Pillar more generally.
‘The only way is up? Social mobility and equal opportunities’
On 4 May, in Paris, Eurofound and the OECD Centre for Opportunity and Equality hosted a joint high-level
conference ‘The only way is up? Social mobility and equal opportunities’. The event brought together an
interdisciplinary group of international experts, policymakers and stakeholders from OECD and EU countries to
discuss evidence on the extent of mobility between generations and identify policies supporting upward mobility,
particularly of disadvantaged population groups. The event was opened by OECD Chief of Staff and Sherpa to the
G20 Gabriela Ramos and Eurofound Director Juan Menéndez-Valdés. 
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Digital age
Living and working in Europe 2016     63
One of the promises held out by the ICT revolution was
that anyone who could do their tasks using a computer
and a phone would be able to work from home,
avoiding the stressful commute and the distractions of
the workplace. ‘Telework’ entered the workplace
vernacular and progressive employers put the policies
in place to implement it. Telework became feasible
around the same time as consensus was rising about
the desirability of maintaining a work–life balance, and
it fitted neatly in the toolbox of measures to help people
reconcile the demands of work and home life. But a
backlash came as prominent companies such as Yahoo!
and IBM had a change of mind and decided to restrict or
completely ban staff from teleworking. They argued
that it interfered with spontaneous interaction and
sharing of ideas between employees, stifling
opportunities for development and innovation.
So how much impact has telework had on the world of
work? Not much. While take-up has picked up in the
past five years, just 3% of workers work regularly from
home. A further 5% are highly mobile workers who work
from several locations (including home) regularly, while
10% telework occasionally from various locations but
with much lower mobility than the highly mobile group. 
Its reach into the workplace varies markedly across
Member States, being more widespread in Scandinavia
and much less so in eastern European countries, Greece
and Italy (Figure 34). The extent of ICT spread and
internet connectivity as well as the national work
culture and economic structure influence its adoption in
different countries.
In part, the ability to telework is restricted by the nature
of one’s work. It is a viable option for those who can
work independently and whose use of ICT is high; hence
its greater prevalence among knowledge workers.
Teleworkers are often professionals and managers;
substantial numbers of clerical workers rank among
them, too, while sales representatives are common in
the highly mobile group. On the other hand, it is not
feasible for many lower-skilled jobs that require a fixed
workplace – machine operators or shop assistants, for
example. For these reasons, too, telework is less
common in manufacturing and retail and more
common in ICT, financial services and services in
general. 
Lack of ICT skills among employees has probably held
back the wider adoption of telework, but this is hardly
an insurmountable obstacle; it can be tackled by
procuring the necessary technology and providing
training. A more intractable barrier is managerial
resistance, springing from a mistrust of employees’
ability to work efficiently and productively when
unsupervised. However, the bulk of the evidence on the
productivity of teleworkers suggests that it is higher
than that of employees based in the employers’
premises. This better performance is put down to
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Is telework taking off?
Figure 34: Rate of teleworking in Member States by type, 2015
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015
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several factors including greater autonomy, fewer
interruptions and improved efficiency due to the use of
ICT. Another factor is that teleworkers put in longer
hours on average. 
This finding – that teleworkers work longer hours than
office-based workers – is uncovered time and time again
by studies. A French study found that teleworkers used
the extra time they saved by not commuting to do extra
work – hence travel time became working time. Data
from the UK Labour Force Study show that teleworkers
work more overtime on average than office-based
workers (9.8 hours per week compared with 8.4 hours).
It also found that 80% of teleworkers’ overtime is
unpaid, compared with 60% for other employees. The
EWCS confirms, as illustrated in Figure 35, that the
freedom to work anytime and anywhere is also the
ability to work more. Other studies suggest that much
telework supplements traditional office work (unpaid
and informally) rather than substituting for it.
Putting in additional working time at home blurs the
boundaries between work and home life, raising the
question of whether the work–life balance of
teleworkers is actually any better than that of workers
in the employer’s premises. Respondents to surveys on
the issue, and sometimes the same individuals, report
both positive and negative impacts on work–life
balance. The EWCS findings suggest that regular
home-based teleworkers have slightly better work–life
balance than those based at their employer’s premises,
but that highly mobile workers, many of whom spend
time on the road, have difficulty getting the fit right.
Overall, it seems that working time becomes more
elastic as it becomes interspersed with non-working
time. So while there is certainly scope for teleworkers to
use their time more efficiently, work and home life tend
to meld once teleworkers spread their working day over
a longer period.
Figure 35: Average weekly hours worked by teleworkers and employees based at employer’s premises,
EU, 2015
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015
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Digital age: Working anytime, anywhere – The effects on
the world of work
Digital age: Automation, digitisation and platforms –
Implications for work and employment. Concept paper
eurofound.link/ef1658 
eurofound.link/ef18002
Future of work
Machines are replacing humans in the performance of tasks, networking technology is dispersing the workforce
geographically, and digitalisation is enabling new ways of working and new relationships between employers and
workers. Meanwhile, the evolution of the economy and the demands of business are normalising non-standard types
of work such as part-time and temporary work. The future of work has become a burning issue among policymakers,
social partners and scholars as they seek to anticipate and prepare for the possible shape of work in the digital age.
ILO conferences
Eurofound enjoys close cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and in 2017 contributed to a
number of conferences stemming from the ILO’s Future of Work Centenary Initiative. With this programme, the ILO
aims to understand the transformations in the world of work and to respond effectively to it. Its themes encompass
many of Eurofound’s own fields of research, including quality of work, work organisation, employment relationships
and labour force participation. 
On 28 March in Madrid, Eurofound Director Juan Menéndez-Valdés participated in a panel discussion on the theme
‘Decent work for all’ at the ILO’s Spanish tripartite conference ‘The future of work that we want’. Convened by the ILO
and Spain’s main social partner organisations, the event’s opening address featured ILO Director Guy Ryder as a key
speaker.
On 12 May, the Irish ILO conference, hosted by the Irish government in Dublin, brought together experts from the
social partners, industry and academia to explore new forms of work – particularly in the context of the digital
economy and the impact of technology on employer–employee relationships. Eurofound’s Adviser – Industrial
Relations, David Foden, presented findings from the Agency’s research on the subject. 
David Foden also participated in the 10th European Regional Meeting of the ILO in Istanbul on 2–5 October,
contributing to a plenary panel debate on ‘decent jobs for all’, where he shared the results of Eurofound research on
working conditions, new forms of employment, fraudulent forms of contracting work and self-employment. 
EU Presidency events
Juan Menéndez-Valdés delivered a keynote speech on
new forms of work and their regulation, as well as the
implications for the labour market and social security
systems at the high-level conference ‘Future of work:
Making it e-Easy’ on 13–14 September organised by
the Estonian EU Presidency. The aim of the
conference was to provide a vision for developing
policies for the changing nature of work that will
ensure high employment, decent jobs, adequate
social security, and a highly skilled workforce for the
productive digital economy.
An informal EMCO meeting,
hosted by the Estonian
Presidency on 21–22 September,
followed up on that conference.
Donald Storrie, Chief Researcher
at Eurofound, addressed the topic
of non-standard forms of
employment – part-time
employment, temporary
employment and self-
employment – and the extent to
which they are becoming more
prevalent in the EU.
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Report launch: 
Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world of work
Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the
world of work, a joint report of the ILO and
Eurofound, was launched on 15 February 2017.
As digital technology extends into every aspect
of working life, this research report highlights
the opportunities and challenges of telework.
The study synthesises research carried out by
both organisations in 15 countries, including
10 EU Member States as well as Argentina,
Brazil, India, Japan and the United States. The
study also provides recommendations on how
policy can enable employers and workers to
best benefit from the opportunities offered by
telework.
Digital age: Policy message
Technology is steadily displacing humans across jobs and sectors, but public protest has been muted, perhaps
because this has not led to employment loss on any grand scale – look to the recession for that. It has caused the
loss of specific jobs – semi-skilled routine jobs in manufacturing, especially, but also in services – the number of
travel agents in the US has halved since 2000, for instance. But, as Eurofound’s research has highlighted, a job
comprises a bundle of tasks, some of which are more easily automated than others. So what is more likely than a
massive annihilation of jobs, in the medium term at least, is that routine and repetitive tasks will be automated,
while tasks requiring human abilities – problem solving, creativity and social skills – are recombined into new
occupations. More jobs in the future could potentially have more variety, be more stimulating and more rewarding.
But each new possibility opened by digital innovation seems to raise both opportunities and challenges. Telework,
for instance, offers workers greater flexibility to manage their working time, but constant connectivity can
pressurise workers to be available around the clock. 
The quintessential job of the digital economy, in its current phase at least, is the crowd worker operating task-by-
task through a digital platform. It does indeed ‘disrupt’ our traditional understanding of what constitutes a job. It
opens new opportunities for employment and offers workers more freedom in when and how they work; in many
of its manifestations, it also epitomises poor job quality: low pay, insecurity, lack of a social protection safety net
and few of the benefits that employees enjoy. However, crowd employment is still limited and mainly provides
supplemental work; few European workers do it as their main job. However, it does signal the paths down which
the digital economy could evolve. The emergence of new forms of economic activity underlines that governments
and social partners must intervene in digitally driven structural change to employment and labour markets and
play a critical role in defining the shape of the future digital economy to defend and balance the interests of both
business and workers.
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Monitoring
convergence in the
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As the European Union recoups the losses of the crisis
and seeks a sounder footing for future growth, the
concept of convergence has taken centre stage in the
policy discourse. There has always been the expectation
that economic union would lead to balanced
development among its Member States. One of the aims
of the founding Treaty of Rome was to reduce ‘the
differences existing between the various regions and the
backwardness of the less favoured regions’.
Convergence was conceived mainly in economic terms,
and it was assumed that social convergence would
unfold as a corollary. That assumption was not
mistaken: EU membership has led to an improvement in
living standards across all Member States, although the
catch-up process of less-developed new members has
varied greatly, both in terms of pace and timing.
Convergence in the EU context, however, does not
necessarily mean that the expectation is one of parity
between Member States, which would imply faster rates
of growth for those at lower levels. Its
conceptualisation, as most recently expressed in the
Rome Declaration of March 2017, envisages rather that
Member States ‘will act together, at different paces and
intensity where necessary, while moving in the same
direction, as we have done in the past’. 
The actual term ‘convergence’ first appeared in the
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 in
relation to the convergence – primarily in terms of
monetary and fiscal indicators – required for
membership of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). The first decade of EMU saw strong real
convergence in GDP per capita and narrowing wage
inequality as well as widespread convergence in living
standards. The severe economic crisis, however, stalled
this process of convergence. 
Working conditions
Consistent patterns of convergence are elusive in many
facets of living and working in Europe. Evidence from
the 2015 EWCS, for instance, shows Member States out
of step on improvements in working conditions over
2005–2015, a period taking in the crisis, with different
trends on different dimensions of job quality. The
clearest sustained upward convergence, in terms of
overall improvement among Member States with less
favourable conditions, has been in working time quality
– an area more subject than others to formal policies
and collective bargaining. In eight countries, working
time quality improved over a decade, despite the crisis,
seven of them eastern European countries that acceded
to the EU in 2004 (Figure 36). In France, Ireland, Malta,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, working time
quality has fallen over the decade; in the remaining
Member States, it is unchanged. 
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The quest for convergence 
Figure 36: Member States with upward convergence in working time quality, 2015 
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2015
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In the area of physical risk (the dimension of job quality
most tightly regulated through European-level
legislation), a number of countries with poor scores in
2005 (Portugal, Spain, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, Finland,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) improved
better than average over the decade. In another group
of countries with poor scores (Lithuania, Slovenia,
France and Poland), physical risk increased further.
As for skills, a dimension largely influenced by
company-level policies, most countries did not see
much change over the decade. However, a pronounced
upward trend is apparent in a few – among them Spain
and Ireland – while others, such as Hungary and Latvia,
show a downward trend since 2010.
Quality of life
As described in the earlier chapter ‘Quality of life and
public services’, convergence in quality of life has been
partial at best. Some countries consistently perform
well on dimensions of quality of life across the editions
of the EQLS, and others consistently rate poorly. The
proportion of people who are disadvantaged on
multiple dimensions was still more pronounced in 2016
in some societies than in others.
Some convergence can be seen in levels of satisfaction
with the standard of living across Member States
between 2011 and 2016. However, as noted earlier,
there are still 11 countries in which more than half the
population report difficulties in making ends meet. Life
satisfaction increased between 2011 and 2016 in some
EU countries, especially Estonia, Hungary and the UK,
but it was unchanged in most, and declined in Greece,
Italy and Spain,
The average quality ratings of public services have
increased almost across the board since 2011. However,
it is not an easy matter to decide whether there has
been convergence between countries or not, given the
disparities in the provision of services. There are huge
differences across Member States in the numbers of
people using formal services (such as childcare and
long-term care), which underlines the large gaps in the
availability of services in some Member States. The cost
of using services is still a significant barrier in several
Member States, especially in south-east Europe.
Levels of trust in institutions have become more
divergent, and the differences do not follow the usual
west–east or north–south split (Figure 37). Countries
such as Estonia and Malta are among the top 10
countries in this and other indicators of quality of
society.
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Figure 37: Scores on trust in institutions,
Member States, 2016     
Source: European Quality of Lile Survey, 2016 
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The question on optimism yields an interesting result
(Figure 38). In five countries, people are more optimistic
about their children’s future than their own future. Four
of these are former Eastern Bloc countries, and their
optimism for the next generation is possibly due to the
improvements in quality of life that they have
experienced since joining the EU. In 12 other countries,
mostly in western Europe, people are less optimistic
about the prospects for future generations than for their
own, which may be down to a decrease in living
standards in this generation.
Figure 38: Comparison of Member States based on optimism about the future, 2016 
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016
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Read more
Converging economies, diverging societies? Upward
convergence in the EU – Foundation Forum 2017:
Background paper
Converging economies, diverging societies? Upward
convergence in the EU - Foundation Forum 2017 -
Session 1: Employment and working conditions 
Converging economies, diverging societies? Upward
convergence in the EU - Foundation Forum 2017 -
Session 2: Living conditions
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Session 3: Convergence and the regional dimension
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The concept of convergence as well as convergent and
divergent trajectories among Member States were
explored at the 2017 Foundation Forum,
Eurofound’s flagship event. Under the theme
‘Converging economies, diverging societies? Upward
convergence in the EU’, convergence in Europe was
debated within the context of Eurofound’s multiannual
work programme and its strategic objectives, focusing
particularly on convergence in relation to employment
and working conditions, living conditions, and
disparities between regions. 
Foundation Forum 2017
Read more
Taking the Forum forward – From Dublin to Gothenburg
eurofound.link/forumforward 
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Disparities in household income levels between Member
States are considerable, as they are within Member
States. Figure 39 represents the distribution of annual
household disposable income for the EU as a whole,
broken down by Member State, in 2013. It shows the
percentage of Europeans of working age found across
six income categories (adjusted to take into account
differences in price levels across countries). Each bar
represents intervals of €1,000, so for example, around
4.5% of Europeans of working age have a household
disposable income between €10,000 and €11,000 per
year. 
The differences in household disposable income levels
between Member States are clearly reflected by the
positioning of countries in the graph. Eastern European
countries (and Mediterranean countries to a lesser
extent) are much more present in the bottom quintile,
corresponding to income levels below €9,000, while
EU15 countries account for almost all the people found
in the top quintile, corresponding to income levels
above €25,000. 
But there is also a significant degree of overlap in the
distribution of income within Member States. For
instance, the countries that dominate the top quintile
also have a significant population share in the lowest
income quintile. This implies that income disparities
within countries are larger than income disparities
between countries in the EU.
Patterns of convergence and
divergence
Income inequalities in the EU declined from 2003 up to
the Great Recession, mostly as a result of convergence
in income levels between Member States. This
convergence was largely a catch-up by low-income
countries, particularly in eastern Europe; apart from
Spain, Mediterranean countries failed to converge. In
most high-income countries, income levels remained
stable or even declined (notably in the UK) until 2008.
After 2008, Mediterranean countries saw a decline in
income levels while in most eastern European countries
they continued to grow but at a much lower rate. 
Income inequality widens across
and within Member States
Figure 39: Distribution (%) of household disposable income by quintile, Member States, 2013  
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Standards, 2014 
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EU-wide income inequalities increased as a result of an
expansion of inequalities within countries and a halt to
the process of income convergence between countries.
The biggest expansion of inequalities took place
between 2009 and 2010, with more moderate
developments since then. This seems linked to large
drops in low-paid employment after 2008, a
development that affected many countries but to
different extents, and therefore contributed to a
between-country divergence.
Household disposable income inequalities expanded in
two-thirds of Member States between 2008 and 2013 –
not only in peripheral countries that were hit severely
by the recession but also in some traditionally more
egalitarian countries in the European core such as
Germany and Sweden. However, the increases have
been quite moderate, rising above 10% in only seven
countries (Cyprus, Hungary, Estonia, Denmark,
Slovenia, Spain and Ireland). In contrast, household
disposable income inequalities fell in one-third of
Member States over the same period (Luxembourg,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the UK, France, the
Netherlands and Portugal).
There is evidence that European welfare states partially
cushioned the effect of drops in earnings as inequalities
in household market income (income before taxes and
transfers) rose to a greater extent than household
disposable income (income after taxes and transfers).
While inequalities in household market income grew by
almost 3% between 2009 and 2014 (income referring to
2008 and 2013 respectively), inequalities in household
disposable income rose by less than 2%. Nevertheless,
recent developments suggest a certain deterioration in
the capacity of welfare states to counterbalance
growing market inequalities.
Read more
Labour market change: Income inequalities and
employment patterns in Europe before and after the
Great Recession
eurofound.link/ef1663 
Informal EPSCO, ‘Making work pay’  
Eurofound research findings were presented
to the informal EU Social Affairs and
Employment Ministers (EPSCO) meeting in
Valetta, Malta on 3–4 April, the theme of which
was ‘Making work pay’. Commissioner
Marianne Thyssen opened the meeting by
highlighting that inequalities undermine
people’s faith in a just society, and that efforts
must be geared towards ensuring that
everyone can put their talents to work.
Eurofound Director Juan Menéndez-Valdés
addressed the gathering on the subject of
income inequalities both within and between
the Member States, showing that income
disparities within countries are larger than
income disparities between countries in
the EU.
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Monitoring convergence in the European Union: Policy message
The role of the European Union in promoting convergence of social outcomes within Member States is not
immediately obvious, as social policy is the responsibility of national governments. But EU policymakers have
recognised that a ‘deeper and fairer union’ requires convergence in more than just the economic indicators, and
that the EU must deliver on the promise of high employment and social progress before any further deepening of
the integration process. The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights must be seen in light of this
development. The aim of the Social Pillar is to give guidance on the support of people’s rights regarding
employment, working conditions and social protection, serving as a compass for the future development of Social
Europe. 
The Foundation Forum produced 12 key messages proposing critical components for the process of upward
convergence. These later fed into the Gothenburg Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth where the Pillar of
Social Rights was proclaimed.
1. To mainstream the principles included in the European Pillar of Social Rights in policy implementation at
different levels (EU, national, regional actors).
2. To establish a limited number of clear priorities for action; this could include social protection for all workers
regardless of their formal status, non-segmented labour markets, quality unemployment protection,
activation measures, living wages.
3. To establish the necessary tools to ensure Europe is ready to preserve social convergence in the next economic
crisis. Economic and social priorities must be integrated in the framework of EMU.
4. To level the playing field in working conditions.
5. To protect employment as a core social right by improving employability and guaranteeing access and
transitions to good jobs and employment trajectories.
6. To base competition on good working conditions that ensures workers’ engagement and optimal
performance.
7. To encourage companies to play a socially responsible role in adapting to changes in the world of work.
8. To empower social partners to enable them to find solutions through collective negotiations.
9. To align the social and economic dimensions of convergence and invest in long-term strategies for education
and care, health and housing.
10. To consider complementing indicators beyond the current Social Scoreboard to other measures, such as
quality of life, and policy/input indicators going beyond outcomes.
11. To align the use of the Structural Funds with the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and focus
funding on activities which have been positively evaluated and demonstrate added value.
12. To support regional initiatives that develop regional partnerships (firms, social partners, civic society, local
administration) to build collective capacities and avoid duplication.
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Visiting Eurofound
On 17 May, Eurofound welcomed Irish participants from the Our Voices project to its offices in Dublin. Our Voices
provides citizens with a forum to discuss furthering social inclusion in Europe. The participants included
volunteers from All Together in Dignity Ireland and members of the North-west Inner City Training and
Development Project. The visit was an opportunity for the participants to learn about the role of an EU agency and
to discover more about its work.
Visiting Eurofound
Completing Eurofound’s programme
of visits from the European
diplomatic community in Ireland for
2017, the Agency welcomed a
delegation from the Benelux group
of countries on 5 December.
Researchers presented an overview
of Eurofound’s activities and
described initiatives for cooperation
at national level.
Pictured from left to right are
Wemmechien Hofman,
Senior Economic Officer, Embassy of
the Netherlands to Ireland;
Bernadette Scheid, Deputy Head of Mission Embassy of Belgium to Ireland; Peter Kok, Ambassador of the
Netherlands to Ireland; Pierre-Emmanuel De Bauw, Ambassador of Belgium to Ireland; Ivan J. Healy, Honorary
Consul of Luxembourg  to Ireland; Eurofound Deputy Director Erika Mezger; and Eurofound Director
Juan Menéndez-Valdés.
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Looking forward
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This was the first year of Eurofound’s four-year work
programme Towards upward convergence 2017–2020. It
was also the year the European Pillar of Social Rights
was proclaimed, a milestone in EU history that provides
concrete proof of the EU’s commitment to citizens’
social rights within a deeper and fairer economic and
monetary union. Eurofound’s research and
communication for 2018 will contribute to the reservoir
of knowledge that Member States will need to put the
Social Pillar into action in all of its three chapters –
equal opportunities and access to the labour market;
fair working conditions; and social protection and
inclusion. This work is organised along 10 topical
activities: 
£ Working conditions and sustainable work
£ Social dialogue
£ Reporting on working life developments
£ Well-functioning and inclusive labour markets
£ Monitoring structural change and managing
restructuring
£ Innovation and job creation in companies
£ Quality of life and quality of society
£ Public services 
£ The digital age: Opportunities and challenges for
work and employment 
£ Monitoring convergence in the European Union
The main outputs from each of these activities in 2018
are described below.
Working conditions and
sustainable work
Using data from the 2015 EWCS and the 2016 EQLS,
Eurofound is conducting a study on the challenges of
reconciling work and family life for both workers and
non-workers. This will feed into the discourse around
the topic at EU level, prompted by the Commission’s
proposal for a work–life balance directive to enable
more women to participate in the labour market and to
encourage a better sharing of caring responsibilities
between men and women. 
Eurofound continues to examine emerging forms of
employment that change the traditional relationship
between employers and employees. Research into
casual work, with a specific focus on zero-hour and
very-short-hour contracts, and the risks and
opportunities associated with it will be published in
2018.
Understanding the conditions experienced by workers
outside the EU is increasingly relevant in a globalised
economy, and Eurofound will publish a joint report with
the ILO analysing working conditions in a number of
non-EU countries. Another study (with EU-OSHA) looks
at the associations between working conditions and the
physical and mental health of workers.
Social dialogue
As the EU urges greater involvement of the social
partners in EU policymaking and better functioning at
national level, Eurofound has launched a study to
examine the linkages between European social dialogue
and the national levels, focusing particularly on better
understanding of the cooperation mechanisms used in
decision-making and implementation in multinational
companies. The evidence provided will point actors in
social dialogue to areas and processes where better
linkages between different levels of social dialogue
could render social dialogue more efficient.
Reporting on working life
developments
In 2018, Eurofound expects to consolidate its role as the
portal of reference on working conditions and industrial
relations for EU and national policymakers, providing
continually updated comparative information on actors
and institutions, topics discussed and outcomes
achieved. It continues to provide systematic and
comparable data on national industrial relations
systems and developments in working conditions. This
includes updating of the working life country profiles,
which provide background information on industrial
relations systems with an overview of main features,
actors and issues for each Member State.
Well-functioning and inclusive
labour markets
As detailed earlier in this report, a considerable number
of workers live in poverty. Perhaps it is time for a living
wage to supersede the minimum wage. The concept of a
living wage has been developed as a way to provide
workers with an adequate income to maintain a decent
standard of living. Eurofound is currently conducting a
study on the living wage, to explore how it is calculated
in different countries and regions in Europe.
Monitoring structural change
and managing restructuring
The Agency will publish its latest findings from the
European Restructuring Monitor, the only available
European data source mapping large-scale
restructuring activity. The data collected complements
the annual analysis of labour market and restructuring
trends based on the EU-LFS. Using data from the 2015
European Working Conditions Survey, Eurofound will
investigate the associations between restructuring and
working conditions. This will be supplemented by
qualitative research on company initiatives addressing
those who remain in the firm after restructuring.
Innovation and job creation in
companies
Following the job loss of the crisis years,
decision-makers seek to understand the policy
mechanisms that support job creation. Eurofound will
publish findings from a project examining publicly
funded initiatives in Member States that are designed to
foster innovation and that also have employment
effects through, for example, job retention, new hiring,
skill development or improved working conditions.
Such information is essential for the design and
implementation of targeted and effective public
support for job creation, particularly in a time of public
budget restrictions.
Quality of life and quality
of society
The European Quality of Life Survey is a unique,
pan-European source of information about the lives of
citizens. As the EU plots a course towards upward
convergence in living standards of Europeans, the EQLS
will publish reports on important facets of quality of life:
social cohesion and trust in national institutions. The
survey data will also be used to inform a series of policy
briefs on the themes of social insecurity and resilience;
living conditions of people with chronic illness and
disabilities; the changing face of life in rural Europe; and
intergenerational differences in well-being. An overview
of the key dimensions of quality of life in the EU
candidate countries will also be published.
Public services
Good-quality, accessible public services can perform an
equalising function in society, raising the quality of life
and living standards of people lower on the social
ladder. In 2018, Eurofound will publish a study on
access to and quality of social services in the EU
Member States based on the 2016 EQLS and other
sources. The findings will identify factors that influence
quality of social services in general and how they differ
for different societal groups. The analysis will examine
developments over time in access to and quality of
services, with specific attention to social inequalities.
Digital age: Opportunities and
challenges for work and
employment
Long-held understandings of employment and work are
being eroded as digital technology extends into all
aspects of working life. The implications for the labour
market need to be understood to inform decisions
about the need for and direction of policy intervention.
Current research by Eurofound on crowd employment –
task-based employment where a digital platform
mediates the relationship between worker and client –
is exploring the working and employment conditions
associated with this new form of employment as well as
its scale and scope in Europe. An online resource is
being established to enable access to various types of
information on crowd employment that Eurofound has
compiled.
Monitoring convergence in the
European Union
Eurofound aims to become a point of reference in the
growing debate on convergence in the EU and will
provide ongoing up-to-date information and evidence
on Member States’ convergence trends and
performances.  The Agency will publish the conceptual
framework for its work on convergence as well as a set
of indicators for monitoring progress. A study to
monitor convergence in employment and
socioeconomic circumstances has started, as has the
development of an interactive web repository on
convergence to give EU and national policymakers as
well as scholars and citizens access to this information.
Consolidated annual activity report
Eurofound’s Consolidated annual activity report is published alongside Living and working in Europe 2017. It
describes Eurofound’s activities, particularly its research and information and communication programmes as well
as its policy achievements, in relation to the objectives set in the 2017 work programme. It also provides details on
Eurofound’s performance as evidenced by its key performance indicators, which give a balanced view on the
different aspects of the Agency’s achievements.
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